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MAXIMIZING UTILITY IN ELECTRIC
UTILITY REGULATION
JONAS J. MONAST
ABSTRACT
The electric power sector is undergoing a period of profound change, reacting to economic, technological, and regulatory variables that have emerged quickly and largely without
warning. In many states, the public utility commission (PUC) will play a key role in determining how electric utilities respond to these rapidly changing circumstances, the outcome
of which will affect electricity rates, investor returns, public health, and local and state
economies for decades to come. The general mandate underlying many utility commission
proceedings—seeking the least cost option for maintaining a reliable electricity sector—
provides the PUC with considerable discretion to choose among sources of information, potential outcomes, and risk assessments.
The least cost framework is generally treated as an objective standard, but a close examination of PUC decisions demonstrates the inherent subjectivity and the value choices commissioners face when determining which electric utility decisions are in the public’s best
interest. From a descriptive perspective, the effort to maximize societal benefits and minimize societal costs associated with electricity generation and delivery is, at its core, a utilitarian exercise. Like the concept of welfare maximization that lies at the heart of the classic
utilitarian framework, the cost minimization goal seeks to produce the greatest good for the
greatest number through an affordable and reliable electricity sector. From the normative
perspective, accepting that PUC decision-making is a utilitarian exercise invites a critical
assessment of whether PUCs are succeeding in implementing the least cost mandate. This
Article provides an overview of PUC decision-making and the least cost framework, then
examines the inherent discretion in the least cost mandate by analyzing four recent PUC
decisions where commissioners reach opposing decisions based on the same set of facts. The
Article concludes by proposing mechanisms for capturing broader societal benefits through
an expanded application of the PUCs’ existing discretion.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The electric power sector is undergoing a period of profound
change, reacting to economic, technological, and regulatory factors
that have emerged quickly and largely without warning. The combination of low natural gas prices and more stringent limits on mercury and other toxic emissions is driving the retirement of a large number of coal-fired power plants.1 Rooftop solar is emerging as a potentially disruptive force due to the rapid decrease in the cost of photovoltaic panels, renewable energy tax credits, net metering policies,
and third party leasing models that allow consumers to install solar
at no upfront cost.2 Nationally, electricity demand dropped significantly during the 2008–2009 economic downturn and is projected to
remain relatively flat due to efficiency improvements throughout the
economy. 3 In addition, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA) promulgated performance standards in August 2015 to limit
carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions from both new and existing fossil
fuel-fired power plants.4 The combination of factors, and the pace at
which they have emerged, introduces a significant degree of uncertainty as utilities and state regulators consider multibillion-dollar
decisions that will impact the makeup of the electricity sector for
decades to come.
In many states, the public utility commission (PUC)5 plays a key
role in determining how electric utilities respond to these rapidly
1. Projected Retirements of Coal-Fired Power Plants, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN.
(July 31, 2012), http://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.cfm?id=7330.
2. See Diane Cardwell, On Rooftops, a Rival for Utilities, N.Y. TIMES (July 26, 2013),
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/27/business/energy-environment/utilities-confront-freshthreat-do-it-yourself-power.html?_r=1.
3. U.S. Economy and Electricity Demand Growth Are Linked, But Relationship Is
Changing, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN. (Mar. 22, 2013), http://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/
detail.cfm?id=10491.
4. Clean Power Plan for Existing Power Plants, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY,
http://www2.epa.gov/carbon-pollution-standards/clean-power-plan-proposed-rule (last visited Feb. 27, 2016).
5. Utility commissions go by different names in different states, including the Public
Service Commission and State Commerce Commission.
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changing circumstances, the outcome of which will affect electricity
rates, investor returns, public health, and local and state economies.
This period of transition provides an important window for reexamining the role of utility commissioners, the values that animate their
least cost determinations, and the relationship between environmental impacts and consumer prices. The general mandate underlying
many utility commission proceedings—seeking the least cost option
for maintaining a reliable electricity sector—provides the PUC with
considerable discretion to choose among sources of information, desirable outcomes, and risk assessments. A careful examination of
PUC decisions exposes the subjective aspects of the least cost mandate and the value choices embedded in the process that directly
influence the outcome.
Consider the quandary of a utility commission when facing the
question of whether to invest hundreds of millions of dollars—costs
that ratepayers will absorb—to retrofit older coal-fired power plants
to comply with new environmental regulations. Ostensibly, the outcome depends upon commissioners’ views of future environmental
regulations, future natural gas prices, future technological options,
and future electricity demand.6 Economic modeling may assist with
the analysis, but the accuracy of modeling results depends on the assumptions made regarding the future, quality of data included in the
model, and interpretation of the results.
Furthermore, attempts to quantify future costs and decisions regarding which costs to accept depend on value choices on the part of
commissioners evaluating the data. Acknowledging the discretion
underlying the least cost mandate allows a more open discussion
about what values should be considered. By identifying the embedded
values choices, and how those choices impact decisions, stakeholders
in the PUC process can better scrutinize the regulatory process to
determine whether or not commissions are accomplishing the least
cost mandate in actuality.
Decisions regarding the makeup of the electricity sector have
wide-ranging economic and environmental impacts. While direct regulation of public health impacts generally falls outside the jurisdiction of the PUC, one view of societal least cost allows consideration of
the costs and impacts associated with emissions from power plants
into the decision-making processes due to the financial impact of future environmental regulations. The PUC, therefore, need not take
6. See, e.g., David Hoppock et al., Determining the Least-Cost Investment for an Existing Coal Plant to Comply with EPA Regulations Under Uncertainty 2 (Nicholas Inst. for
Envtl. Policy Sols., Working Paper No. 12-03, 2012), https://nicholasinstitute.duke.edu/
sites/default/files/publications/determining-the-least-cost-investment-for-an-existing-coalplant-to-comply-with-epa-regulations-under-uncertainty-paper.pdf.
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on the role of an environmental regulatory agency in order to consider, and potentially mitigate, the environmental impacts of utilitysector investments. As recent history demonstrates, ignoring the potential for future regulations to require additional capital expenditures, and thus raise rates, can be just as significant as ignoring fuel
price risk or potential changes in electricity demand.7
The effort to maximize societal benefits and minimize societal
costs associated with electricity generation and delivery is, at its
core, a utilitarian exercise. Like the concept of welfare maximization
that lies at the heart of the classic utilitarian framework, the cost
minimization goal seeks to produce the greatest good for the greatest
number. In the context of traditional electricity sector oversight, the
greatest good is generally viewed as affordable and reliable electricity. Also like Jeremy Bentham’s pleasure maximization goal, the concept of “least cost” invites differing interpretations, and commission
decisions turn on which criteria are considered and how much weight
is afforded to each variable.8
There is no shortage of opinions regarding the appropriate structure and governance model for the electricity sector.9 This Article con7. See JAMES E. MCCARTHY, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42144, EPA’S UTILITY MACT:
WILL THE LIGHTS GO OUT? 4 (2012), http://www.eenews.net/assets/2012/01/19/
document_gw_03.pdf (stating that investments to comply with the Utility MATS rule will
lead to an average increase of 3.1% ($3–$4 per month) in the cost of electricity and that
electricity retail price increases will vary from a low of 1.3% in California to a high of 6.3%
in the area served by the Southwest Power Pool, meaning Oklahoma, Kansas, and parts of
five other states); OWEN ZINAMAN ET AL., NAT’L RENEWABLE ENERGY LAB., THE EVOLVING
ROLE OF THE POWER SECTOR REGULATOR: A CLEAN ENERGY REGULATORS INITIATIVE
REPORT 3-4 (2014), http://www.nrel.gov/docs/fy14osti/61570.pdf (stating that raising rates
to reflect the true cost of delivered electricity may be necessary to ensure the financial
health of the utility and that regulators must consider fuel delivery risks and potential fuel
price volatilities to facilitate an energy-secure power sector); Assessment of EPA’s Utility
MACT Proposal, BIPARTISAN POL’Y CTR. (Mar. 24, 2011), http://bipartisanpolicy.org/wpcontent/uploads/sites/default/files/Q&A%20Assessment%20of%20MACT%20Rule.pdf (stating that retail electricity prices will increase by an average of 3.7%); Retail Electricity Price
Increases Due to New EPA Rules, AM. COALITION FOR CLEAN COAL ELECTRICITY (Oct. 2011),
http://www.publicpower.org/files/CustomerConnections/ACCCERegionalElectricityPriceMa
pJune2011.pdf (explaining that MATS increase electricity prices in regions of the United
States covering all or part of thirty states, with peak-year increases exceeding ten percent
and as high as nineteen percent); Daniel J. Weiss & Zachary Rybarczyk, Don’t Believe the
Hype Against EPA Mercury Rules: Opponents Puff Up Costs to Consumers While Ignoring
Benefits, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS (Feb. 8, 2012), https://www.americanprogress.org/
issues/green/news/2012/02/08/11084/dont-believe-the-hype-against-epa-mercury-rules/ (explaining that on average electricity rates will increase by about 2%).
8. For a discussion of Bentham’s theories, see JEREMY BENTHAM, AN INTRODUCTION
TO THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND LEGISLATION (London, Oxford University Press Warehouse 1879). See generally Hoppock et al., supra note 6.
9. See, e.g., SOFIA AIVALIOTI, SABIN CTR. FOR CLIMATE CHANGE, COLUMBIA LAW SCH.,
ELECTRICITY
SECTOR
ADAPTATION
TO
HEAT
WAVES
43-44
(2015),
http://web.law.columbia.edu/sites/default/files/microsites/climate-change/white_paper__electricity_sector_adaptation_to_heat_waves.pdf (arguing that adaptation to climate
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tributes to the debate by turning a critical eye toward the application of
the least cost mandate. In most states, the existing least cost decisionmaking framework allows for broad consideration of trends affecting electricity prices and the suite of societal impacts resulting from those decisions. Part II of this Article outlines the current regulatory structure overseeing electric utility decisions, with an emphasis on the role of the state
PUC. Part III explores the implicit value choices underlying PUCs’ application of the least cost mandate and the range of emerging factors that
argue for an expanded view of least cost to best achieve the interrelated
goals of affordability, reliability, and minimization of environmental impacts. Finally, Part IV offers a framework for expanding the least cost
methodology to consider a wider range of variables and potential societal
impacts.
II. THE UTILITY COMMISSION ROLE IN
ELECTRICITY SECTOR OVERSIGHT
Regulation of the electricity sector originated at the state level in
the early 1900s,10 with its roots based on the principles that electricity generation and transmission constitute a natural monopoly,11 centralized control of electricity generation and transmission produces
lower prices, and economic regulation is necessary to control the monopoly’s exercise of market power. 12 States have retained primary
jurisdiction over retail sales of electricity, but over time federal and

change requires long-term planning by the electricity sector, as well as engagement, communication, and open dialogue between governments of all levels and other relevant stakeholders); Hal Harvey, A New Business Model for the Electricity Sector, HILL (July 15, 2015,
6:34 PM), http://thehill.com/opinion/op-ed/248104-a-new-business-model-for-the-electricitysector (explaining that utilities should be given a long-term mandate for the core energy
goals: affordability, reliability, and a clean environment, and should be rewarded when
they exceed the mandates and penalized when they fail); Chris Mooney, The U.S.’s Energy
Infrastructure Will Need Major Changes, Says Obama Report, WASH. POST (Apr. 21, 2015),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/energy-environment/wp/2015/04/21/major-changesneeded-for-u-s-power-infrastructure-says-obama-report/ (stating that the energy grid needs
to make room for more renewable power).
10. William J. Hausman & John L. Neufeld, The Market for Capital and the Origins of
State Regulation of Electric Utilities in the United States, 62 J. ECON. HIST. 1050, 1050 (2002).
11. See Dayna B. Matthew, Doing What Comes Naturally: Antitrust Law and Hospital
Mergers, 31 HOUS. L. REV. 813, 822 n.33 (1994) (“During the mid- to late 1800s, John Stuart
Mill, responding to the growth of a competitive global economy, coined the term ‘natural monopoly’ and distinguished these monopolies from ‘artificial’ monopolies.” (citing JOHN STUART
MILL, PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL ECONOMY 448-50 (W.J. Ashley ed., 1909))); Jim Rossi, Universal Service in Competitive Retail Electric Power Markets: Whither the Duty to Serve?, 21
ENERGY L.J. 27, 29 (2000) (“[T]he economics of natural monopoly regulation provide the predominant intellectual framework supporting extraordinary obligations for providers of utility
services.”).
12. See William Boyd, Public Utility and the Low-Carbon Future, 61 UCLA L. REV.
1614, 1639, 1643-44 (2014).
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state regulation of the electricity sector has expanded.13 Numerous
government agencies now oversee the electric utility sector, including
state PUCs, state environmental agencies, state energy offices, the
U.S. EPA, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC), the
Nuclear Regulatory Commission, and the Department of Energy. Together, these agencies pursue multiple public policy objectives, including: providing affordable and reliable electricity, setting nondiscriminatory prices, maintaining stable prices and avoiding “rate
shocks,” protecting public health, protecting against environmental
harm beyond human health impacts, ensuring energy security, allowing for local economic development, promoting renewable energy,
preventing waste by promoting demand-side management and

13. Id. at 1628-32.
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energy efficiency, and other state policy goals.14 The result is a complex, and at times, uncoordinated governance structure.15
PUCs are products of state laws, and their mandates differ among
the states. Nonetheless, there are common approaches to PUC decision-making, such as expecting utilities to seek efficient options for
meeting electricity demand, focusing on system reliability,16 and gov14. See, e.g., 16 U.S.C. § 2601 (2012); 16 U.S.C. § 824; 42 U.S.C. § 15801 (2012); 42 U.S.C. §
17001; Public Utilities Act, N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 62-1 to -50 (2014). The North Carolina Public Utilities Act’s lengthy “declaration of policy” highlights the breadth of goals a PUC seeks to achieve,
including:
[P]rovid[ing] fair regulation of public utilities in the interest of the public; promot[ing] the
inherent advantage of regulated public utilities; . . . promot[ing] adequate, reliable and
economical utility service to all of the citizens and residents of the State; . . . assur[ing]
that resources necessary to meet future growth through the provision of adequate, reliable utility service include use of the entire spectrum of demand-side options, including
but not limited to conservation, load management and efficiency programs; . . . requir[ing] energy planning and fixing of rates in a manner to result in the least cost mix of
generation and demand-reduction measures which is achievable, including consideration
of appropriate rewards to utilities for efficiency and conservation which decrease utility
bills; provid[ing] just and reasonable rates and charges for public utility services without
unjust discrimination, undue preferences or advantages, or unfair or destructive competitive practices and consistent with long-term management and conservation of energy
resources by avoiding wasteful, uneconomic and inefficient uses of energy; . . . assur[ing]
that facilities necessary to meet future growth can be financed by the utilities operating
in this State on terms which are reasonable and fair to both the customers and existing
investors of such utilities; . . . authoriz[ing] fixing of rates in such a manner as to result in
lower costs of new facilities and lower rates over the operating lives of such new facilities
by making provisions in the rate-making process for the investment of public utilities in
plants under construction; encourage[ing] and promot[ing] harmony between public utilities, their users and the environment; . . . foster[ing] the continued service of public utilities on a well-planned and coordinated basis that is consistent with the level of energy
needed for the protection of public health and safety and for the promotion of the general
welfare . . . seek[ing] to adjust the rate of growth of regulated energy supply facilities . . .
cooperat[ing] with other states and with the federal government in promoting and coordinating interstate and intrastate public utility service and reliability of public utility energy supply; . . . and . . . promot[ing] the development of renewable energy and energy efficiency through the implementation of a Renewable Energy and Energy Efficiency Portfolio Standard (REPS) that will [d]iversify the resources used to reliably meet the energy
needs of consumers in the State. Provide greater energy security through the use of indigenous energy resources available within the State. Provide improved air quality and
other benefits to energy consumers and citizens of the State.
§ 62-2 (effective Jan. 1, 2008).
15. See Hari M. Osofsky & Hannah J. Wiseman, Hybrid Energy Governance, 2014 U. ILL. L.
REV. 1 (2014).
16. FERC, the North American Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC), and its subregions, and in some states, Regional Transmission Organizations or Independent System
Operators also play important roles regarding reliability. See id. at 36-40; About NERC,
NERC, http://www.nerc.com/AboutNERC/Pages/default.aspx (last visited Feb. 27, 2016);
Capacity Market (RPM), PJM, http://www.pjm.com/markets-and-operations/rpm.aspx (last
visited Feb. 27, 2016) (“PJM’s capacity market, called the Reliability Pricing Model, ensures
long-term grid reliability by securing the appropriate amount of power supply resources
needed to meet predicted energy demand in the future.”); Reliability Operating Procedures,
MISO,
https://www.misoenergy.org/MarketsOperations/ReliabilityOperatingProcedures/
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erning the economic aspects of electric utility regulation.17 States typically delegate primary responsibility for other aspects of electric utility oversight, such as public health impacts, to other agencies. There
are also notable differences among the states, chief among them the
different scope of PUC authority in states following the traditional
regulatory model versus the states that have restructured their electricity markets. Restructured states rely on competition among electricity generators to provide power and limit prices. 18 PUCs in restructured states do not, therefore, directly regulate generation investments. 19 These states maintain the monopoly structure for
transmission and distribution services, with PUCs overseeing rates
that distribution companies charge to consumers, the capital expenditures necessary to maintain the distribution system infrastructure,
and any electricity procurement by the distribution company.20
The majority of states maintain the traditional regulatory model,
with electric utilities operating as vertically integrated firms, controlling generation, transmission, and retail sales, and subject to rate
regulation by the state utility commission.21 Of all the agencies overseeing aspects of the electric power sector, the PUC in a traditionally
regulated state is most directly involved in a regulated utility’s decisions regarding how it meets electricity demand, including whether
to build a new facility and, if so, what type.
This Article focuses on traditionally regulated states and draws
upon representative proceedings to identify common approaches and
notable differences in approaches to least cost planning. This Article
does not attempt to provide a thorough examination of any particular
state. The following subsections offer an overview of PUC decisionmaking, including the elements that utility commissions must balance when determining whether to allow utilities to recover expendiPages/ReliabilityOperatingProcedures.aspx (last visited Feb. 27, 2016) (noting that the
RTO “ensures real-time operating reliability of the interconnected bulk electric
system . . . within the MISO reliability footprint”).
17. Commissioners typically refer to themselves as economic regulators. David Hadley, Comm’r, Ind. Util. Regulatory Comm’n, The Commissioner’s Challenge 3-4 (Oct. 4,
2004), http://www.gasification.org/uploads/eventLibrary/03HADL_Paper.pdf (“Today I am
an economic regulator. Regulated utilities face folks like me all across the country with one
thought – least cost. . . . There are many valid arguments about the cost of NOT being environmentally responsible. But as an economic regulator, I must approve of continually
increasing cost of environmental compliance for coal fired power plants.”).
18. See Peter Fox-Penner & Heidi Bishop, Mission, Structure, and Governance in Future Electric Markets: Some Observations, 89 OR. L. REV. 1107, 1109 (2011).
19. See id.
20. See id.
21. Status of Electricity Restructuring by State, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN. (Sept.
2010), http://www.eia.gov/electricity/policies/restructuring/restructure_elect.html. Note that
vertically integrated utilities also purchase and sell electricity in wholesale markets.
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tures through rates charged to consumers and the least cost framework that PUCs in most states utilize to balance the competing interests of ratepayers, utilities, and their investors.
A. Cost-of-Service Rate Setting
The traditional state regulatory model for the electricity sector
emerged based on the natural monopoly concept.22 Due to the high
cost of infrastructure, it was more efficient for a single firm to own
and operate generation and transmission assets rather than allow
competition through redundant infrastructure investments.23 States
relied on utility commissions to control the market power that results
from the monopoly structure.24 In exchange for an exclusive service
territory, the utility is subject to rate regulation by the state PUC.25
PUCs set rates based on the cost of providing the service, including capital costs and operating costs.26 In general, a commission must
determine that a utility expenditure was prudently incurred before
including that cost in the utility’s “rate base.”27 Prudency may turn
on a number of factors, including whether a utility asset is “used and
useful” (i.e., it provides a service to customers).28 Due to the challenge
22. See Boyd, supra note 12, at 1643-44.
23. See id.
24. See, e.g., DIV. OF POLICY ANALYSIS & INTERGOVERNMENTAL LIAISON, FLA. PUB.
SERV. COMM’N, MARKET POWER IN A TRANSITIONING ELECTRIC INDUSTRY 1 (2001),
http://www.psc.state.fl.us/Files/PDF/Publications/Reports/Electricgas/markpwr.pdf.
25. KARL MCDERMOTT, EDISON ELEC. INST., COST OF SERVICE REGULATION IN THE
INVESTOR-OWNED ELECTRIC UTILITY INDUSTRY: A HISTORY OF ADAPTATION 5-8 (2012),
http://www.eei.org/issuesandpolicy/stateregulation/Documents/COSR_history_final.pdf.
26. JONATHAN A. LESSER & LEONARDO R. GIACCHINO, FUNDAMENTALS OF ENERGY
REGULATION 78-82 (2d ed. 2013).
[T]he standard ratemaking formula: R = O + (B x r), where R is the utility’s allowed revenue requirement, O is its operating cost, B is rate base, and r is the
utility’s cost of capital. B increases as the utility’s investment increases. O increases to the extent of the annual depreciation of the plant but decreases to
the extent that the new plant permits a reduction in the use of plants with
higher operating costs (principally fuel costs).
Richard J. Pierce, Jr., The Regulatory Treatment of Mistakes in Retrospect: Canceled Plants
and Excess Capacity, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 497, 511 (1984) (footnote omitted).
27. See, e.g., COLO. CODE REGS. § 723-3, at 3617(d) (2015) (affording presumption of
prudence for utility actions consistent with an approved resource plan); Pub. Serv. Co. of
Colo., No. C13-0436 (Colo. Pub. Utils. Comm’n Mar. 21, 2013) (denying recovery of certain
smart grid investments based on the utility’s failure to demonstrate prudence).
28. See, e.g., Potomac Elec. Power Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 661 A.2d 131, 137-38
(D.C. 1995); El Paso Nat. Gas Co. v. Fed. Power Comm’n, 281 F.2d 567, 573 (5th Cir. 1960);
Glustrom v. Colo. Pub. Utils. Comm’n, 280 P.3d 662, 669 (Colo. 2012) (noting that the
“used and useful” test is “one of several permissible tools of ratemaking, one that need not
be . . . employed in every instance” (quoting Jersey Cent. Power & Light Co. v. Fed. Energy
Regulatory Comm’n, 810 F.2d 1168, 1175 (D.C. Cir. 1987))); North Carolina ex rel. Utils.
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inherent in determining what qualifies as a prudent investment on
the part of the regulated utility, commissions traditionally base prudency determinations on laws and other circumstances in existence
at the time of the decision.29 Commissions also set the rate of return
that utilities earn for the capital expenditures included in the rate
base and determine which variable costs, such as fuel and labor expenditures, utilities may recover from consumers.30
The rate-setting process grants broad discretion to commissions.
The U.S. Supreme Court, and subsequently state courts, recognized
that agencies with the delegated legislative power to set rates are not
bound “to the service of any single formula or combination of formulas.”31 These agencies
are free, within the ambit of their statutory authority, to make the
pragmatic adjustments which may be called for by particular circumstances. Once a fair hearing has been given, proper findings
made and other statutory requirements satisfied, the courts cannot intervene in the absence of a clear showing that the limits of
due process have been overstepped.32

If the agency decision, “as applied to the facts before it and viewed
in its entirety, produces no arbitrary result, [the Court’s] inquiry is at

Comm’n v. Carolina Water Serv., Inc., 439 S.E.2d 127 (N.C. 1994); SCOTT HEMPLING,
PRESIDE OR LEAD?: THE ATTRIBUTES AND ACTIONS OF EFFECTIVE REGULATORS 190-92 (2d
ed. 2013) (“Courts have defined prudence circularly, as avoiding ‘unreasonable costs,’ operating at ‘lowest feasible cost,’ and ‘operat[ing] with all reasonable economies.’ ” (alteration
in original) (citing Gen. Tel. Co. of Upstate N.Y. v. Lundy, 218 N.E.2d 274, 277
(N.Y. 1966))).
29. See, e.g., Ky. Power Co., No. 2009-00545 (Ky. Pub. Serv. Comm’n June 28, 2010)
(denying Kentucky’s application for approval of renewable energy purchase agreement for
wind energy resources between); Appalachian Power Co., 263 P.U.R. 4th 297 (W. Va. Pub.
Serv. Comm’n Mar. 6, 2008), 2008 WL 1758812 (order on the application for a certificate of
public convenience & necessity for a 629 megawatt integrated gasification combined cycle
generating facility in mason county; Appalachian Power Co., No. PUE-2007-00068 (Va.
State Corp. Comm’n Apr. 14, 2008) (final order denying the application for approval of a
rate adjustment clause under section 56-585.1 A 6 of the Code of Virginia).
30. See LESSER & GIACCHINO, supra note 26, at 78-82.
31. Fed. Power Comm’n v. Nat. Gas Pipeline Co., 315 U.S. 575, 586 (1942). States
have generally adopted the Federal Power Commission holding for state PUCs. See, e.g., S.
Conn. Gas Co. v. Conn. Dep’t of Pub. Util. Control, No. CV094021665S, 2010 WL 1664975,
at *5 (Conn. Super. Ct. Apr. 1, 2010) (citing Nat. Gas Pipeline Co., 315 U.S. at 586); City of
Miami v. Fla. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 208 So. 2d 249, 255-56 (Fla. 1968) (first quoting Fed.
Power Comm’n v. Hope Nat. Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591 (1944); then citing Nat. Gas Pipeline
Co., 315 U.S. at 575); Ohio Edison Co. v. Pub. Utils. Comm’n, 589 N.E.2d 1292, 1298 (Ohio
1992) (first quoting Hope Nat. Gas, 320 U.S. at 591; then citing Nat. Gas Pipeline Co., 315
U.S. at 575); see also George Blum et al., Rates and RateMaking, 73B C.J.S. Public Utilities
§ 26 (2015).
32. Nat. Gas Pipeline Co., 315 U.S. at 586.
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an end.”33 The PUC’s discretion is subject to important limitations,
however.34 In addition to complying with all statutory mandates, the
rates must allow utilities to recover costs that were prudently incurred, maintain the financial integrity of the firm, compensate equity investors for the risks they assume, and enable the firm to attract
needed capital. 35 Rates may not be confiscatory, and commissions
must balance the interests of consumers and investors.36 In the end,
rates set by the commission generally must satisfy the “just and reasonable” standard, which courts interpret to address both consumer
and investor interests.37

33. Id. While not binding, commission precedent may still be persuasive, and reviewing courts may nonetheless look to commission precedent when evaluating whether a rate
case is arbitrary and capricious. See, e.g., Cont’l Tel. Co. of the S. v. Ala. Pub. Serv.
Comm’n, 427 So. 2d 981, 993 (Ala. 1982) (“[W]hile stare decisis does not apply to decisions
of administrative agencies such as the Commission, consistency is essential if arbitrariness
is to be avoided.”) (emphasis added); North Carolina ex rel. Utils. Comm’n v. Carolina Util.
Customers Ass’n, 500 S.E.2d 693, 706 (N.C. 1998) (“[T]he final order of the [Utilities]
Commission [in a general rate case] is not within the doctrine of stare decisis . . . prior decisions of [the Supreme Court] regarding general questions of law and the principles underlying those decisions serve to guide the Court’s decisions in individual cases.”) (third alteration in original) (citations omitted).
34. See, e.g., LESSER & GIACCHINO, supra note 26, at 52-54.
35. Hope Nat. Gas Co., 320 U.S. at 605; see Bluefield Water Works & Improvement
Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of W. Va., 262 U.S. 679, 692 (1923).
36. Hope Nat. Gas Co., 320 U.S. at 605. State courts and utility commissions follow
Hope Natural Gas. See, e.g., Glustrom v. Colo. Pub. Utils. Comm’n, 280 P.3d 662, 669 (Colo.
2012); see also S. Bell Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Miss. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 113 So. 2d 622, 656
(Miss. 1959) (“A fair return is one which, under prudent and economical management, is
just and reasonable to both the public and the utility. . . . By that standard the return to
the equity owner should be commensurate with returns on investments in other enterprises having corresponding risks and sufficient to assure confidence in the financial integrity
of the business. What the public is entitled to demand is that no more should be exacted
from the rate payers than the services are reasonably worth.”).
37. The “just and reasonable” language has its roots in the Natural Gas Act. 15
U.S.C. § 717c (2012). State laws governing PUCs have generally adopted the same framework. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 40-3-101(1) (2015) (requiring utility rates to be “just and
reasonable”); IDAHO CODE § 61-302 (2015) (requiring that “[e]very public utility shall furnish, provide and maintain such service, instrumentalities, equipment and facilities as
shall promote the safety, health, comfort and convenience of its patrons, employees and the
public, and as shall be in all respects adequate, efficient, just and reasonable”); MISS. CODE
ANN. § 77-3-33(1) (2015) (stating that the public utility company is entitled to “fair, just
and reasonable rates for the services rendered or to be rendered by it to any person”); N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 62-130(a) (2014) (requiring the PUC to “make, fix, establish or allow just and
reasonable rates for all public utilities subject to its jurisdiction”); WASH. REV.
CODE § 80.28.020 (2014) (authorizing the commission to fix rates determined to be reasonable and just); WIS. STAT. § 196.03(1) (2015) (requiring rates to be reasonable and just).
After the Supreme Court’s decision in Hope Natural Gas, judicial inquiries now typically
focus on whether the end result of the rate-setting process satisfies the just and reasonable
standard and will not second-guess how the commission arrives at the rate. See Hope Nat.
Gas Co., 320 U.S. at 605.
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Commissions typically have additional duties beyond rate-setting.
For example, they may approve siting proposals 38 and, in some
states, review long-term, integrated resource plans (IRPs) wherein
utilities evaluate various scenarios to determine likely future resource needs.39 PUCs may also have a range of duties related to environmental goals, including obligations related to state environmental
policy compliance, implementation of renewable energy and energy
efficiency mandates, and resource planning.40
B. The Least Cost Framework
PUCs seek an outcome that allows the utility to plan for the future, prevents electric utilities operating as monopolies from taking
advantage of market power and charging unreasonably high rates,
allows the utility to hedge various forms of risk without approving
unnecessary expenditures, and allows returns on investment at a
level that maintains the firm’s creditworthiness. Viewed from a theoretical perspective, this effort to balance competing interests in pursuit of an affordable and reliable electricity sector is analogous to the
utilitarian goal of maximizing societal welfare by promoting the
greatest pleasure for the greatest number. 41 Thus, utilitarianism
“perspectives” discourse provides an analytical approach for identifying and weighing multiple factors and seeking the optimal outcome.
Moreover, the consequentialist utilitarian approach judges the merits
of the action on the outcome (e.g., rates that are just and reasonable)
rather than the methodology for determining the course of action
(e.g., which factors were given more or less weight when setting the
rates). In the PUC context, cost minimization coupled with reliability
replace welfare maximization as the desired outcome. To protect against
profit maximizing incentives, states typically employ a “least cost”
framework for assessing whether a utility’s investment is prudent.42

38. See Michael Dworkin et al., Revisiting the Environmental Duties of Public Utility
Commissions (2006), 7 VT. J. ENVTL. L. 1, 42 (2006).
39. See, e.g., U.S. States with Integrated Resource Planning or Similar Planning Process, REG. ASSISTANCE PROJECT (2009), http://www.energycollection.us/Energy-Planning/
US-States-IRP.pdf.
40. Dworkin et al., supra note 38, at 6; Michael Dworkin et al., The Environmental
Duties of Public Utility Commissions, 18 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 325, 331 (2001).
41. Proponents of utilitarianism offer various characterizations of the optimal outcomes. Bentham and Mill, early advocates of utilitarianism as a policymaking tool, suggested that the optimal outcome is one that maximizes pleasure and minimizes pain. See
BENTHAM, supra note 8, at 3. For a detailed discussion of classic philosophic concepts of
rights and duties applied to the energy sector, see BENJAMIN K. SOVACOOL & MICHAEL H.
DWORKIN, GLOBAL ENERGY JUSTICE: PROBLEMS, PRINCIPLES, AND PRACTICES (2014).
42. Melissa Powers, Sustainable Energy Subsidies, 43 ENVTL. L. 211, 221 (2013).
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This approach may appear as a statutory or regulatory obligation,43
or PUCs themselves may introduce the concept as a factor in prudency determinations.44
The regulation of the natural monopoly seeks to maximize societal
welfare by allowing the firm to operate without competition while
preventing abuse of market power. 45 Thus, the characterization of
PUC decision-making as a pursuit of the classic utilitarian goal of
welfare maximization is descriptive rather than a normative argument for altering the regulatory approach. As previously described,46
the PUC is charged with considering multiple factors when setting
electricity rates. The different stakeholders affected by the outcome
of a PUC decision—residential and commercial electricity consumers,
industrial electricity consumers, utility shareholders, investors issuing debt to finance a utility’s capital investments, elected officials,
citizens affected by the environmental impacts of electricity generation, individuals and businesses that may benefit from low energy
prices attracting additional economic development to a region, firms
manufacturing electricity generation equipment—may have their
own views of an optimal outcome depending on how it will affect their
core interests. The shareholder seeks increasing share value and
regular dividends. The industrial consumer seeks to maintain low
electricity rates to reduce input costs. The financial institution issuing debt may prefer a larger capital expenditure to generate larger
returns. State legislators and governors may seek to avoid sharp increases in electricity rates. Utility commissioners themselves are also
interested stakeholders. Whether elected or appointed, commissioners operate in a political environment that may create a disincentive
to approve rate increases.
43. See, e.g., HAW. REV. STAT. § 226-18(c)(3), (5) (2013) (stating that the policy of the
state shall “[e]nsure, to the extent that new supply‐side resources are needed, that the
development or expansion of energy systems uses the least‐cost energy supply option and
maximizes efficient technologies”); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 69‐3‐1204(1) (2014) (requiring electric utilities to file a plan that meets customer needs in the most cost‐effective
manner); 170 IND. ADMIN. CODE 4-8-3 (2015) (requiring the PUC to “ensure [that] a utility’s
proposal is consistent with acquiring the least-cost mix of demand-side and supply-side
resources to reliably meet the long-term electric service requirements of the utility’s customers”); MONT. ADMIN. R. 38.5.2001-.2016 (2015) (defining guidelines for least cost planning for electric utilities).
44. See, e.g., Ky. Power Co., No. 2009-00545 (Ky. Pub. Serv. Comm’n June 28, 2010).
The least cost mandate may also appear as the “lowest reasonable costs.” See Miss. Power
Co., No. 2010UA279, 2012 WL 1484068, at *2 (Miss. Pub. Serv. Comm’n Apr. 3, 2012) (final
certificate order).
45. See, e.g., Jim Rossi, Moving Public Law out of the Deference Trap in Regulated
Industries, 40 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 617, 623 (2005) (“For most of the twentieth century,
cost-of-service regulation provided regulators a ready forum for ensuring that rates did not
discriminate in ways that caused serious losses to social welfare.”).
46. See supra Section II.A.
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Both the utilitarian philosophers and the commissioners seeking
to implement policy goals that are, at their core, utilitarian face criticism regarding the conceptualization of the optimal outcome and how
the decision-maker assigns weights to various factors that inform the
outcome. Critics of the utilitarian theory as a guide to personal behavior or policy choices point out that the theory fails to account for
variability in preferences and is subjective regarding the number of
variables to consider or what weight to give those variables.47 Moreover, the theory depends on an accurate assessment of the consequences of a decision, despite the inherent difficulty projecting what
those consequences may be.
PUC processes suffer from the same deficiencies. Although the focus on cost minimization rather than welfare maximization arguably
provides a more objective standard, PUC cases turn on subjective assessments. For example, an inquiry focusing on a narrow range of
near-term variables will likely produce a dramatically different outcome than one that weighs a broader range of variables and considers
impacts over time.48 In many states, the least cost mandate is general
enough to allow either approach, but PUCs generally apply the mandate in a manner than limits the scope of costs taken into consideration to those associated with capital investments. As Part III demonstrates,49 commissioners serving on the same PUC may assign different weight to variables such as certainty, nearness in time, fuel diversity, risk hedging, environmental impacts, and even interpretations of electricity demand growth projections. The outcome of those
PUC decisions may turn as much on commissioners’ value choices
and views of the future as on objective assessments of cost and risk.
Proponents of a strict adherence to benefit-cost analysis may argue that the theoretical utilitarian argument is unnecessary, and instead might promote a more robust effort to quantify the potential
results of a utility decision. There is a lengthy and ever expanding
body of scholarship debating the merits and limits of a benefit-cost
analysis.50 Although the benefit-cost approach frames the discussion
in contemporary regulatory language, it raises many of the same
questions as the utilitarian inquiry—e.g., costs for whom, which ben47. See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, Utilitarianism, Economics, and Legal Theory, 8 J.
LEGAL STUD. 103, 111-19 (1979).
48. See Dalia Patiño-Echeverri et al., Economic and Environmental Costs of Regulatory Uncertainty for Coal-Fired Power Plants, 43 ENVTL. SCI. & TECH. 578, 578-84 (2009).
49. See infra Part III.
50. For competing views of benefit-cost analysis, compare FRANK ACKERMAN & LISA
HEINZERLING, PRICELESS: ON KNOWING THE PRICE OF EVERYTHING AND THE VALUE OF
NOTHING (2004), with Richard A. Posner, Cost-Benefit Analysis: Definition, Justification,
and Comment on Conference Papers, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 1153 (2000).
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efits to consider, and what methods are used to quantify the costs
and impacts.51 Benefit-cost analysis is particularly limited when dealing with “inherently political questions involving contested normative issues.”52
Although this Article does not engage directly in the ongoing debate over the proper application of cost considerations in administrative proceedings, the debate is relevant for PUC decision-making.
Cost impacts are at the heart of PUC inquiries, yet quantifying the
potential impacts of electric utility actions is inherently subjective.
As the following subsections demonstrate, commissioners choose
among a range of reasonable viewpoints regarding the need for new
generation and the factors to consider when evaluating whether an
option is cost-effective, and those choices may lead to very different
near-term and long-term impacts on electricity rates and environmental impacts of the electricity sector. This Article opts for the lens
of classic utilitarian theory as a framework for examining the value
choices inherent in the least cost inquiry and alternative approaches
that may maximize societal benefits beyond simply near-term low
rates for electricity. Rather than undermining the argument for viewing PUC decisions through the utility maximization lens, the discretion and embedded value choices argue for an explicit consideration
of a wider range of variables.
1. The Many Views of “Cost” in Electricity Sector Regulation
Although the observation that utility regulation, as practiced in
many states, is an exercise in utility maximization is descriptive, a
normative argument follows. If, indeed, PUCs aim to maximize societal benefits, one must inquire whether they are achieving that goal
given the wide-ranging economic, health, and environmental impacts
that flow from PUC decisions.
51. Compare Daniel A. Farber, Breaking Bad? The Uneasy Case for Regulatory Breakeven Analysis, 102 CALIF. L. REV. 1469, 1469 (2014) (arguing that breakeven analysis “may
fail to improve the rationality of decisions, especially in hard cases”), with Cass R. Sunstein, The Limits of Quantification, 102 CALIF. L. REV. 1369, 1392 (2014) (proposing use of
“breakeven analysis” to “identify a lower or upper bound for regulatory benefits” in circumstances where quantification is challenging). See also Matthew D. Adler, Beyond Efficiency
and Procedure: A Welfarist Theory of Regulation, 28 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 241, 245 (2000)
(“Two neoclassicists who agree as to the moral significance of efficiency, and as to the
equivalence of welfare and preference satisfaction, may disagree about whether some further moral criterion (besides efficiency) is also relevant in evaluating regulatory choices,
options, and institutions. One neoclassicist may think that the environment has intrinsic
value, apart from human welfare; another may deny that. Or, one neoclassicist may think
that the fair distribution of welfare, as well as Kaldor-Hicks efficiency, is an important
thing; another neoclassicist may be solely concerned with efficiency.”) (footnote omitted).
52. Jonathan S. Masur & Eric A. Posner, Climate Regulation and the Limits of CostBenefit Analysis, 99 CALIF. L. REV. 1557, 1557 (2011).
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Utilities assess infrastructure needs and the associated costs
through scenario analysis that considers variables such as fuel price
fluctuation, policy changes, transmission needs, and technology
options.53
Utility planning also includes qualitative variables, such as “the
importance of fuel diversity, [a firm’s] environmental profile, the
emergence and development of new technologies, and regional economic development considerations.”54 Utilities, regional transmission
organizations, and regulators seek to quantify benefits associated
with the qualitative variables in order to justify the costs, but that
process is challenging and ballpark estimates sometimes must suffice.55 Both the qualitative and quantitative assessments rely on value choices regarding which variables to consider, how much weight to
assign to different variables, and the scope of costs.
The broadest view of the costs associated with electricity generation would incorporate not just electricity rates, but also health costs
resulting from pollutants emitted by the facilities, costs to the local
economy if a power plant contributes to the area’s nonattainment
status for any National Ambient Air Quality Standard, the full suite
of costs associated with climate change mitigation and adaptation,
and externalities arising from the production and transport of the
fuels.56 From the beginning of public utility regulation, states have
opted to separate the cost of service from numerous other costs associated with the production and consumption of electricity, relying on
other government agencies to address those externalities. That separation does not absolve the PUC of all responsibility for the costs beyond electricity rates, however, as the initial decisions regarding
53. See, e.g., DUKE ENERGY, THE DUKE ENERGY CAROLINAS INTEGRATED RESOURCE
PLAN (ANNUAL REPORT) 7 (2012) [hereinafter DUKE ENERGY IRP 2012] (“Quantitative
analysis provides insights on future risks and uncertainties associated with fuel prices,
load growth rates, capital and operating costs, and other variables.”); GA. POWER CO., 2013
INTEGRATED RESOURCE PLAN AND APPLICATION FOR DECERTIFICATION OF PLANT BRANCH
UNITS 3 AND 4, PLANT MCMANUS UNITS 1 AND 2, PLANT KRAFT UNITS 1-4, PLANT YATES
UNITS 1-5, PLANT BOULEVARD UNITS 2 AND 3 AND PLANT BOWEN UNIT 6, at 1-28, GA. PSC
DOCUMENT FILING # 145981 (Jan. 31, 2013), http://www.psc.state.ga.us/factsv2/
Document.aspx?documentNumber=145981 (follow “Attachment: 145981.zip” hyperlink;
then open “IRP MAIN DOC AND DECERT APP); TENN. VALLEY AUTH., INTEGRATED
RESOURCE PLAN: TVA’S ENVIRONMENTAL & ENERGY FUTURE 61-77 (2011).
54. DUKE ENERGY IRP 2012, supra note 53.
55. See, e.g., Ill. Commerce Comm’n v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n, 721 F.3d 764
(7th Cir. 2013).
56. The electricity sector is the primary emitter of mercury and sulfur dioxide in the
United States and is a major contributor of emissions of nitrogen oxides—precursors to
ground level ozone. The 2011 National Emissions Inventory, U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION
AGENCY, http://www.epa.gov/ttn/chief/net/2011inventory.html (last visited Feb. 27, 2016).
In 2013, the sector was also responsible for 31% of U.S. greenhouse gas emissions. Sources
of Greenhouse Gas Emissions, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, http://www3.epa.gov/
climatechange/ghgemissions/sources.html (last visited Feb. 27, 2016).
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what to build are the foundation for many of the other societal costs.
In some circumstances, it may be less costly to society to avoid potentially large rate increases in the future by investing in higher cost
generation options at the outset.57
Despite these impacts on public health and the environment,
states diverge regarding the range of environmental and public
health impacts that the commission may consider. Colorado law, for
example, requires the PUC to “give the fullest possible consideration
to the cost-effective implementation of new clean energy and energyefficient technologies in its consideration of generation acquisitions
for electric utilities, bearing in mind the beneficial contributions such
technologies make to Colorado’s energy security, economic prosperity,
insulation from fuel price increases, and environmental protection.”58
In addition, the Colorado PUC “may give consideration to the likelihood of new environmental regulation and the risk of higher future
costs associated with the emission of greenhouse gases such as carbon dioxide when it considers utility proposals to acquire resources.”59 North Carolina’s Public Utilities Act (NC PUA) offers an
example of a less specific environmental obligation, instructing the
state’s commission to “encourage and promote harmony between public utilities, their users and the environment.”60 Legislatures in other
states expressly prohibit PUCs from considering certain environmental impacts in the rate-setting process.61 For example, North Dakota
law prohibits the state’s PUC from “us[ing], requir[ing] the use of, or
allow[ing] electric utilities to use environmental externality values in
the planning, selection, or acquisition of electric resources or the setting of rates for providing electric service.”62
Legislation explicitly expanding the range of factors PUCs consider may foster consideration of a broader suite of public policy goals
affected by electric utility decisions. However, in the absence of legis57. See, e.g., Richard N. L. Andrews, State Environmental Policy Innovations: North
Carolina’s Clean Smokestacks Act, 43 ENVTL. L. 881 (2013); David Hoppock et al., Benefits
of Early State Action in Environmental Regulation of Electric Utilities: North Carolina’s
Clean Smokestacks Act (Nicholas Inst. for Envtl. Policy Sols., Working Paper No. NI WP
12-05, 2012).
58. COLO. REV. STAT. § 40-2-123(1)(a) (2015).
59. Id. § 40-2-123(1)(b).
60. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 62-2(a)(5) (2014). Notably, the mission statement on the
NC Utilities Commission website lists a broad range of PUC obligations found in the
NC PUA’s “Declaration of Policy” but neglects to mention the environmental provision.
See Welcome to the North Carolina Utilities Commission, N.C. UTILS. COMM’N,
http://www.ncuc.commerce.state.nc.us/ (last visited Feb. 27, 2016).
61. See Richard D. Gary & Michael L. Teague, The Inclusion of Externalities in Electric Generation Resource Planning: Coal in the Crossfire, 95 W. VA. L. REV. 839, 862-63
(1993).
62. 1995 N. D. Laws 1311.
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lation specifically limiting the factors they may consider, PUCs can
generally take steps within the least cost framework to pursue a
range of societal objectives affected by the electricity sector. For example, although direct regulation of public health impacts may fall
outside the regulatory purview of the utility commissioner, it does
not follow that commissioners must turn a blind eye to the health
impacts of their decisions. 63 PUC decisions affect the amount and
types of emissions, and due to the costs locked in when constructing a
new power plant, they also affect the economic impact of changing
course.64 The EPA’s Mercury Air Toxics Rule (requiring reductions in
mercury emissions) and the Cross State Air Pollution Rule (CSAPR)
(limiting sulfur dioxide (SO2), nitrogen oxides (NOx), and particulate
matter (PM) emissions originating at coal-fired power plants in upwind states and affecting a downwind state’s compliance with air
quality standards) offer cautionary tales regarding the risk of ignoring the prospect of more stringent environmental regulations. Both
rules affected the cost of existing coal-fired power plants, with the
impacts differing by state based on the number of coal-fired power
plants that did not meet the new standards. The states with less reliance on uncontrolled coal-fired power plants were less affected by
new EPA regulations.65 Ignoring the prospect of higher costs over the
lifetime of a facility may subject consumers to higher prices while
also robbing them of the benefits of early action.66 Therefore, viewing
environmental issues through the lens of potential increases in operating costs over the lifetime of a power plant should allow commissioners to consider impacts on public health and the environment
under existing least cost framework unless explicitly prohibited by
state law from doing so.67

63. See, e.g., North Carolina ex rel. Utils. Comm’n v. High Rock Lake Ass’n, 245
S.E.2d 787, 790 (N.C. Ct. App. 1978) (finding that environmental considerations are “generally left to other regulatory agencies, except as they affect the cost and efficiency of the
proposed generating facility”). This Article is not proposing to burden PUCs with the primary responsibility of mitigating climate change. Such a broad problem requires attention
from a range of state and federal agencies.
64. Patrick Bean & David Hoppock, Least-Risk Planning for Electric Utilities 3 n.2
(Nicholas Inst. for Envtl. Policy Sols, Working Paper No. NI WP13-05, 2013) (“Electricity
sector capital investments tend to have low salvage values, meaning most costs are sunk
and unrecoverable if the investment does not operate as planned.”).
65. The North Carolina Clean Smokestacks Act is an example of a state taking action
to reduce SO2, NOx, and mercury before the promulgation of Utility MATS and CSAPR,
resulting in lower costs. Clean Smokestacks Act, 2002 N.C. Sess. Laws. 4 (codified as
amended at N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 62-143, 143-215.105-.114C (2014)). See generally Andrews,
supra note 57; Hoppock et al., supra note 57.
66. See Hoppock et al., supra note 57, at 16.
67. See, e.g., 1995 N. D. Laws 1311 (prohibiting the PUC from considering environmental externalities).
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Uncertainty about the future complicates the cost minimization
challenge, and utilities and PUCs may compensate by assuming perfect foresight when inputting assumptions into energy models.68 The
resulting projections may fail to consider the potential cost impacts of
changing circumstances and also may undervalue non-cost factors.
As a result, the traditional application of the least cost framework
may undermine the goal of minimizing cost in the long term, as policy shifts to force electric utilities to internalize environmental externalities or as consumers bear costs in other ways such as medical
bills.69
Achieving the least cost goal during the next one to two decades,
and avoiding stranded generation assets resulting from changing
economic and regulatory factors, is particularly complex due to the
increased level of uncertainty regarding technology, markets, and
regulation. Expanding the variables embedded in the least cost assessment could allow regulators to incorporate temporal considerations (e.g., short-term versus long-term “least cost” approaches), potential technological advances affecting demand or driving costs
down if new technology can achieve market penetration, and public
health and environmental impacts of electricity sector actions.
2. Assessing the Least Cost Option
Under the least cost framework, the optimal choice is the least
cost investment after accounting for other factors such as reliability,
state renewable energy or energy efficiency mandates, other legal
68. Perfect foresight in the modeling context refers to modeling exercises that assume
scenarios remain constant throughout the period in question. For example, a scenario assuming high natural gas prices would maintain that assumption for each year included in
the modeling exercise. The results produced by this approach may differ significantly from
an exercise that tests the impacts of periodic fluctuations in fuel prices. Compare, NW.
POWER & CONSERVATION COUNCIL, SIXTH NORTHWEST CONSERVATION AND ELECTRIC
POWER PLAN (2010) (utilizing an iterative modeling process with fuel price fluctuations),
with U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., ANNUAL ENERGY OUTLOOK 2015 WITH PROJECTIONS TO
2040 (2015), http://www.eia.gov/forecasts/aeo/pdf/0383(2015).pdf (analyzing numerous scenarios using a perfect foresight approach for each scenario).
69. See, e.g., HEALTH & ENVTL. IMPACTS DIV., U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, EPA-452/R1-11-011, REGULATORY IMPACT ANALYSIS FOR THE FINAL MERCURY AND AIR TOXICS
STANDARDS, at ES-3 (2011), http://www.epa.gov/ttnecas1/regdata/RIAs/matsriafinal.pdf
(stating that emissions reductions under the final MATS rule could yield health co-benefits
of up to $90 billion dollars in 2016, based on the avoidance of mercury- or fine particlerelated health problems such as: 4200 to 11,000 premature deaths, 2600 hospitalizations
for respiratory and cardiovascular diseases, 4700 nonfatal heart attacks, and 3.2 million
missed work days due to respiratory symptoms); JOHN A. ROMLEY ET AL., THE IMPACT OF
AIR QUALITY ON HOSPITAL SPENDING xi-xii tbl.S.2 (2010), http://www.rand.org/
content/dam/rand/pubs/technical_reports/2010/RAND_TR777.pdf (explaining that not
meeting federal clean air standards for PM2.5 and ozone caused an estimated 29,808
health events, resulting in an estimated $193 million spent on hospital care in California
from 2005–2007).
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obligations, and a range of risk factors. The electricity sector is not
static, however. New information, changing market conditions, more
stringent regulations, and emerging technologies can all alter the
calculus.70 There may be compelling reasons, therefore, to invest in a
more expensive option in the near-term to hedge against potential
increases in operating costs and capital expenditures in the future.
Many large-scale capital investments for new electricity generation assume power plants will operate for a minimum of three to four
decades.71 Investors are entitled to recoup capital investments and
earn a rate of return on those investments once a PUC determines
that the expenditures were prudent and approves incorporating the
expenditures into the utility’s rate base.72 Circumstances may change
dramatically during a plant’s service life, potentially resulting in additional capital expenditures to comply with new regulations, fluctuation in operating costs due to fuel price volatility, and competition
from newer facilities utilizing more efficient technologies.73
Hedging against the risk of costly future regulatory developments
(e.g., regulation of a new pollutant or tightening existing emission
limitations) presents a particularly challenging proposition for PUCs.
Approving an electric utility investment in anticipation of a regulatory change that never materializes would result in consumers paying
higher rates than required by existing law. Conversely, ignoring the
prospect of increased costs due to future emission limits may cause a
generating facility to face early retirement or additional costs to
comply with the new regulations—costs that recent examples demonstrate could exceed $1 billion for an individual facility.74 Distinguishing between legitimate hedging and efforts aimed at simply maximizing investors’ returns, therefore, is an important, yet difficult, task
for the utility commissioner.
Consider the scenario where a regulated monopoly determines
that it must construct a 500-megawatt (MW) power plant to meet
electricity demand. The firm is considering either a $500 million conventional natural gas combined cycle plant or a $3.5 billion coal-fired
70. See, e.g., Pierce, supra note 26 (discussing the impact of changing circumstances
on nuclear power plant construction).
71. Age of Electric Power Generators Varies Widely, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN.
(JUNE 16, 2011), http://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.cfm?id=1830 (noting that 51% of
the U.S. electric generating capacity was at least 30 years old at the end of 2010).
72. See, e.g., Bluefield Water Works & Improvement Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of W.
Va., 262 U.S. 679 (1923).
73. See, e.g., STAN KAPLAN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL34746, POWER PLANTS:
CHARACTERISTICS AND COSTS 24 (2008) (noting that “fuel prices have been notoriously difficult to predict”); Pierce, supra note 26, at 509-10. For more discussion of uncertainty and
irreversibility in the electricity sector, see infra Section III.B.
74. Hoppock et al., supra note 57, at 17.
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gasification plant that captures CO2 emissions.75 The rate structure
would allow the firm’s shareholders to receive seven times the return
on the coal-fired investment. Assuming each option would result in
the same rate of return and a PUC determination of prudency would
ensure the ability to recover all capital costs, the rational economic
actor would seek to maximize value for shareholders and investors.76
To protect against profit maximizing incentives, commissioners
typically employ a “constrained least cost” framework to assess
whether an investment is prudent. Under this framework, the optimal choice is the least cost investment after accounting for other factors, such as grid reliability, state and federal laws, existing infrastructure, and fuel price projections. These non-cost objectives act as
constraints on a cost minimization goal. Some non-cost variables are
more straightforward to assess than others. State laws may change
the least cost calculus by requiring utilities and PUCs to consider
environmental externalities when evaluating the potential options, or
mandating renewable energy and energy efficiency investments
through portfolio standards.77 Others are more difficult to quantify,
such as uncertainty regarding fuel prices and future regulations.
Some states have deliberately moved away from a narrow “least
cost” approach. The California Public Utilities Commission, for example, opted for a “least cost, best fit” analysis that recognizes there
may be generation options, such as renewable energy, that are more
costly but offer additional benefits.78 In other states, departing from a
strict adherence to a “least cost” approach would require statutory or
regulatory changes, yet even a narrow interpretation of least cost invites consideration of factors that affect near-term and long-term
electricity rates.

75. These estimates are based on the U.S. Energy Information Administration’s (EIA)
2013 capital cost estimates for new power plants. U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., UPDATED
CAPITAL COST ESTIMATES FOR UTILITY SCALE ELECTRICITY GENERATING PLANTS (2013),
http://www.eia.gov/forecasts/capitalcost/pdf/updated_capcost.pdf. According to the EIA
estimates, the average overnight capital cost for a conventional natural gas combined cycle
(NGCC) plant a $917 per kilowatt hour (KWh). Id. at 6. Using these assumptions, the cost
for a 500 MW plant would be $458.5 million. The estimate for a single unit coal-fired integrated gasification combined cycle (IGCC), such as the new plant under construction in
Kemper County, Mississippi, is $6599 per KWh, or $3.29 billion. Id. The cost estimates are
not directly analogous because the estimated nominal capacities for the two plants differ
(620 MW for the NGCC unit and 520 MW for the IGCC unit). Id.
76. See Harvey Averch & Leland L. Johnson, Behavior of the Firm Under Regulatory
Constraint, 52 AM. ECON. REV. 1052, 1068 (1962); Boyd, supra note 12, at 1651-58.
77. See, e.g., DUKE ENERGY IRP 2012, supra note 53 (discussing quantitative and
qualitative analysis of system planning options).
78. Jeff Guldner & Meghan Grabel, Dealing with Change: The Long-Term Challenge
for the Electric Industry, NAT. RESOURCES & ENV’T 3, 6 (2008).
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Utility commissions may approve a more expensive electricity
generation option if it offers additional benefits such as diversity in
the fuel mix or long-term price certainty. Commissions may also allow utilities to reduce exposure to regulatory risk, although, as noted
above, PUCs may find these risks difficult to assess.79 Under the example in the previous paragraph, if a regulated firm justifies the $3.5
billion option solely on the likelihood of a future environmental regulation and the regulation is never implemented, shareholders would
reap large returns while consumers would pay higher rates to mitigate a risk that never materializes.
As the IGCC example demonstrates, the stakes are high. Decisions regarding whether to construct new power plants and, if so,
what types of power plants to build and when to build them have
broad impacts on electricity rates, local economies, and public health.
New, large-scale power plants are major investments, and utilities
generally expect to operate a plant for decades to recover costs.80 Under normal circumstances, ratepayers must compensate the utility
even if changing circumstances result in higher than anticipated
costs. PUCs are generally prohibited from retroactive rate-setting.81
This provides a high degree of certainty to the utility and its investors once a capital expenditure is included in the utility’s rate base,
transferring investment risk to ratepayers who will compensate the
utility for its investment through a rate-of-return established by
the PUC.
III. THE LEAST COST MANDATE AND THE
CHANGING ELECTRICITY LANDSCAPE
A. The Least Cost Mandate in Action
The following subsections explore differing approaches to the least
cost mandate in states that have not directly altered the factors
79. Other agencies at the federal or state levels may take action to incentivize or require innovation in the electricity sector. This point refers to specifically to the view of
the PUC.
80. See, e.g., Age and Capacity of Operating US Coal and Gas Fired Generators, Fall
2011, ROCKY MOUNTAIN INST., http://www.rmi.org/RFGraph-age_capacity_operating_US_
coal_gas_generators (last visited Feb. 27, 2016); Age of Electric Power Generators Varies
Widely, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN. (June 16, 2011), http://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/
detail.cfm?id=1830.
81. See, e.g., La. Power & Light Co. v. La. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 523 So. 2d 850, 857 (La.
1988) (“Pervading the utility rate-making process is the fundamental rule that rates are
exclusively prospective in application and that future rates may not be designed to recoup
past losses.”); In re Application of Columbus S. Power Co., 947 N.E.2d 655, 660 (Ohio 2011)
(finding that the Ohio PUC violated both the state law and state constitution when it approved rates that allowed a regulated utility to “recoup[] losses due to past regulatory delay”); Portland Gen. Elec. Co., 86 P.U.R. 4th 463, 479 (Or. Pub. Utils. Comm’n 1987).
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commissioners must address. Each case study offers competing views
of the appropriate outcome. Three of the examples—Kentucky Power,
Mississippi Power Company, and Duke Energy—include dissenting
opinions that articulate reasonable alternative decision-making approaches. The fourth example—Appalachian Power Company—
focuses on a project that required approval by PSCs in Virginia and
West Virginia, but only received partial approval from one and was
rejected by the other. In addition to sharing the common element of
written opinions differing from one another, the cases also include
projects that promised environmental benefits and occurred either
before or at the early stage of the shale gas boom when it was uncertain whether the dramatic drop in natural gas prices would persist.
Together, the examples illustrate how PUCs weigh competing variables, including cost impacts, reliability, fuel diversity, regulatory
risk, and environmental impacts.
1. Kentucky Power Example: Rejection of a Wind Energy Power
Purchase Agreement
A 2010 case before the Kentucky Public Service Commission (PSC)
provides perhaps the best example of the least cost mandate in action, as the case involved a relatively inexpensive power purchase
agreement (PPA) for wind energy that offered the potential to hedge
against potential federal and state regulatory developments that
seemed likely in the near future. Despite the fact that the proposed
PPA would result in a rate increase of less than $1 per month for the
average residential consumer, the PPA faced opposition from the
state’s attorney general and ultimately was denied by the state’s
PSC.
Kentucky Power, a subsidiary of American Electric Power that
serves 170,000 customers in the western part of the state82 sought
approval from the PSC to charge consumers an additional $14 million
to cover the cost of a long-term PPA for 100 megawatts (MW) of electricity produced at a wind energy facility.83 The utility justified its
request based on the Governor’s proposal to implement a renewable
energy standard that would require increasing amounts of renewable
energy as a percentage of sales, legislation introduced in the state’s
General Assembly to mandate the use of renewable energy resources
for generating electricity, and the enactment of renewable energy
mandates in neighboring states. Kentucky Power argued that although there was no renewable energy mandate in Kentucky, “once
82. Regulated Utility Operations, AM. ELECTRIC POWER, http://www.aep.com/about/
MajorBusinesses/RegulatedUtilityOperations.aspx (last visited Feb. 27, 2016).
83. Ky. Power Co., No. 2009-00545, at 1, 3 (Ky. Pub. Serv. Comm’n June 28, 2010).
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such a standard is enacted, the increased demand for renewable generation will cause the prices for renewable energy to increase, making the pending wind power contract even more economically beneficial.”84 The new contract would cost an estimated $14.3–$14.5 million
per year, resulting in an increase of $0.71 per month for the average
residential consumer.85 In essence, Kentucky Power was proposing to
hedge business risk by entering into a long-term contract to provide
wind energy at a stable, competitive price.
The Kentucky Attorney General intervened in the PSC proceeding
and made the following arguments in opposition to the contract:
First . . . there is currently no federal or state renewable energy
requirement and . . . the purchase of wind power is thus a discretionary expense that residential customers and industrial manufacturers cannot afford at this time. Second, . . . Kentucky Power
has no need for the energy expected to be provided by the Wind
Contract because Kentucky Power is energy long and the wind
purchase would only exacerbate that situation. . . . Third, . . . the
Wind Contract is not economic on a net present value basis.86

The Attorney General also argued that the wind project was unlikely to produce as much electricity as Kentucky Power assumed and
that delaying the investment was prudent because improvements in
wind turbine technology would likely result in lower costs in the
future.87
The PSC denied Kentucky Power’s request, agreeing with the Attorney General that the utility did not have an immediate need for
additional generation and “the proposed 20-year wind power contract
has not been shown to be least-cost compared to Kentucky Power’s
available energy sources.”88 The PSC concluded that “[i]n the absence
of legislative certainty regarding future renewable mandates, the
value of the proposed wind power contract is speculative. There is no
mandate at this time for utilities in Kentucky to supply renewable
energy.”89
The PSC Vice Chairman dissented, arguing that the contract was
in fact competitive, pointing out that the price Kentucky Power currently pays for purchased power is approximately $45/MWh, which is
nearly $2 more per MWh than the proposed wind contract price of

84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.

Id. at 2-3.
Id. at 3.
Id.
See id. at 4.
Id. at 6.
Id. at 7.
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$43/MWh.90 Additionally, the dissent argued that the utility needed
to enter into the PPA due to the “great pressures nationally and in
Kentucky to increase renewables. . . . As a Commissioner, I am concerned that ratepayers in a state like Kentucky with no nuclear power, and little potential for in-state renewables . . . will be facing large
rate increases.” 91 Kentucky Power’s “modest proposal would have
guaranteed a price for 20 years for at least a small portion of Kentucky Power’s generation mix and thus I believe it is in fact needed.”92 Furthermore, with the federal wind energy tax credit set to expire, the dissent argued, “[I]t is unlikely that future solicitations will
generate bids as low as this one. Thus, for all of the above-stated reasons, I believe that this contract satisfies Kentucky’s least-cost
principles.”93
The Kentucky Power case highlights the central role that nearterms cost impacts play in PUC proceedings, as well as the reluctance on the part of commissioners and consumer advocates 94 to
accept utility arguments for investments that may hedge against
uncertainty and risk but result in higher rates for consumers.
In hindsight, there are two ways of viewing the decision. From
one perspective, subsequent developments have validated the
PSC majority and the Attorney General. As of the time of the publication date for this Article, there is no renewable energy mandate
in the state, the PSC has approved rate increases for Kentucky
Power consumers even without the proposed wind energy contract,95

90. Id. at 9 (Gardner, Comm’r, dissenting).
91. Id. at 10.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 1 (showing that the Kentucky Attorney General and the trade group Kentucky Industrial Utility Consumers, Inc. intervened to advocate the interests of Kentucky
Power’s consumers).
95. Ronn Robinson, Kentucky Power Files to Withdraw Rate Case, AEP KY. POWER
(Nov. 22, 2013), https://www.kentuckypower.com/info/news/viewRelease.aspx?releaseID=1471
(showing an additional five percent rate increase beginning Jan. 1, 2014); Ronn Robinson,
Public Service Commission Approves Kentucky Power Rate Case Settlement Agreement,
AEP KY. POWER (June 28, 2010), https://www.kentuckypower.com/info/news/viewRelease.
aspx?releaseID=872 (noting that the Kentucky PSC approved a 16.84% rate increase for
Kentucky Power in 2010).
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and Congress did not enact a federal cap-and-trade bill that would
have required electricity generators to acquire emission allowances
for each ton of CO2 emitted during a year.96 Furthermore, the cost of
wind turbines continues to fall.97
The positions of the electric utility and the dissenting commissioner, however, argue that state law does not prohibit reasonable
attempts to hedge risks. Post hoc evaluations may help refine the
scope of the “least cost” framework, but the failure of risks to materialize within a few years should not present a barrier to expanding
the temporal scope of the least cost inquiry, nor should it prohibit
consideration of regulatory risk. As a business investing in infrastructure that will operate for multiple decades, the ability to hedge
reasonably foreseeable risks, including fuel price volatility, regulatory uncertainty, and technology uncertainty may be critical to achieve
the interrelated goals of affordable, reliable, and clean electricity.
This view is bolstered by PUC decisions in a neighboring state. The
same year that the Kentucky PSC denied Kentucky Power’s request,
the Indiana Utility Regulatory Commission approved a new wind energy PPA, noting the “real benefits for [the utility], its customers, and
the State of Indiana.”98 Those benefits included “diversif[ying] [the]
supply portfolio[,] . . . provid[ing] environmental benefits[,] . . . encourag[ing] the proliferation of [in-state renewable energy,] improv[ing the state’s] economy[,] and . . . hedg[ing] against new environmental emissions regulations and potential fuel cost volatility.”99
A subsequent decision by the Kentucky PSC endorsed a similar ap96. The climate policy argument did not appear in the Kentucky Power Co. case, but
the PSC considered the issue in a similar wind energy proceeding involving the regulated
utilities Louisville Gas & Electric and Kentucky Utilities. Motion of Louisville Gas & Electric Co. & Kentucky Utilities Co. for a Declaratory ruling or, in the Alternative, for Waiver
of Certain Filing Requirements at 4 n.3, Louisville Gas & Elec. Co. & Ky. Utils. Co., No.
2009-00353 (Ky. Pub. Serv. Comm’n Aug. 28, 2009) (citing federal legislative proposals to
limit CO2 emissions among the justifications for approval to charge consumers for a power
purchase agreement for wind energy without a full PSC hearing). Ultimately, the PSC
denied the waiver request to permit the utilities to recover the cost of a wind energy power
purchase agreement without a formal PSC proceeding. Order at 8, Louisville Gas & Elec.
Co. & Ky. Utils. Co., No. 2009-00353 (Ky. Pub. Serv. Comm’n Oct. 21, 2009).
97. See, e.g., Diane Cardwell, Solar and Wind Energy Start to Win on Price vs.
Conventional Fuels, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 23, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/11/24/
business/energy-environment/solar-and-wind-energy-start-to-win-on-price-vs-conventionalfuels.html?_r=0 (referring to “recent analyses [that] show that even without those subsidies, alternative energies can often compete with traditional sources”).
98. Ind. Mich. Power Co., No. 43750, 2010 WL 127594 (Ind. Util. Reg. Comm’n Jan. 6,
2010) (citing So. Ind. Gas & Elec. Co., No. 43635, at 8-10 (Ind. Util. Regulatory Comm’n
June 17, 2009)); Indianapolis Power & Light Co., No. 43485 (Ind. Util. Regulatory Comm’n
Oct. 1, 2008); Ind. Mich. Power Co., No. 43328 (Ind. Util. Regulatory Comm’n Nov. 28,
2007).
99. Ind. Mich. Power, 2010 WL 127594 (second alteration in original) (citation
omitted).
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proach to the costs and benefits associated with renewable energy
when it departed from its strict adherence to the least cost analysis
in a case involving a new biomass-fired electricity generating unit.100
Noting the benefits of innovative energy projects to the local economy, the state’s renewable energy goals that included biomass, and
the project’s ability to replace a portion of electricity from a retiring
coal-fired power plant, the PSC approved the project.101
2. Duke Energy Example: Approval of a New Coal-Fired
Power Plant
In 2007, the North Carolina Utilities Commission (NCUC) considered a proposal by Duke Energy Carolinas to construct two new 800
MW coal-fired units at its existing Cliffside Steam Station near Charlotte, North Carolina.102 After testing a number of scenarios through
its long-range resource planning, Duke Energy had determined that
the new coal-fired units were the best option for meeting baseload
electricity demand.103 The utility reached this conclusion despite current factors suggesting the likelihood that the new facility would face
limitations on greenhouse gas emissions through federal climate legislation or through regulations issued pursuant to the existing Clean
Air Act.104 The planning process examined six scenarios that included
100. Kentucky Sidesteps Least-Cost Principles to Approve New PPA, 4143 PUR UTIL.
REG. NEWS 1 (Oct. 25, 2013).
101. Ky. Power Co., No. 2013-00144 (Ky. Pub. Serv. Comm’n Oct. 10, 2013).
102. Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC, 257 P.U.R. 4th 115 (N.C. Util. Comm’n Mar. 21,
2007), 2007 WL 1040917.
103. Id.
104. In 2007, the U.S. Senate was debating the Lieberman-Warner Climate Security
Act that, if enacted, would have created a descending cap on greenhouse gas emissions
from the power sector, transportation sector, and industrial sector. S. 2191, 110th Cong.
(2007). The same year, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that greenhouse gas emissions met
the definition of “pollutant” under the Clean Air Act, thereby requiring the U.S. EPA to
determine whether the pollutants emitted from motor vehicles endangered public health
and welfare. Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 528-29 (2007). The EPA subsequently
made such a finding, resulting in regulations not only limiting CO2 emission limits from
motor vehicles, but also from the power sector and other stationary sources. See, e.g., Endangerment and Cause or Contribute Findings for Greenhouse Gases Under Section 202(a)
of the Clean Air Act, 74 Fed. Reg. 66,496 (Dec. 15, 2009) (codified at 40 C.F.R. ch. 1 (2015));
40 C.F.R. pts. 85, 86, 600 (2015) (originally published as 2017 and Later Model Year LightDuty Vehicle Greenhouse Gas Emissions and Corporate Average Fuel Economy Standards,
77 Fed. Reg. 62,624 (Oct. 15, 2012)); 40 C.F.R. pts. 51, 52, 70, 71 (2015) (originally published as Prevention of Significant Deterioration and Title V Greenhouse Gas Tailoring
Rule, 75 Fed. Reg. 31,514 (June 3, 2010)); 40 C.F.R. pts. 85, 86 (2015); 49 C.F.R. pts. 523,
531, 533, 536, 537 (2015) (originally published as 2017 and Later Model Year Light-Duty
Vehicle Greenhouse Gas Emissions and Corporate Average Fuel Economy Standards, 77
Fed. Reg. 62,624 (Oct. 15, 2012)); Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines for Existing Stationary Sources: Electric Utility Generating Units, 80 Fed. Reg. 64,662 (Oct. 23, 2015) (to
be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 60); Standards of Performance for Greenhouse Gas Emissions
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varying amounts of new coal, natural gas, nuclear, and renewable
generation. The NCUC considered various alternatives for meeting
some or all of the projected near-term demand needs, including investments in energy efficiency, renewable energy, and an integrated
gasification combined cycle (IGCC) plant. 105 Energy efficiency and
renewable energy were seen as ineffective in meeting the level of projected demand growth, and the IGCC technology was considered
risky, too time-intensive, and more costly than the pulverized
coal option.106
The commission approved one of the two proposed 800 MW units.
The NCUC’s decision turned primarily on two factors: (1) the perceived need for additional baseload generation by 2011 and (2) concerns about overreliance on natural gas and the fact that at the time
natural gas was not used to provide baseload power.107 The dissent
argued that coal was not a prudent option for new generation, citing
the provision in the NC Public Utilities Act requiring the commission
to “encourage and promote harmony between public utilities, their
users and the environment.”108 This provision, the dissent claimed, is
not subservient to other NCUC duties.109
The NCUC decision prioritizes timing and fuel mix diversity over
environmental considerations. Although the dissent did not persuade
the commission that it must give equal weight to environmental considerations, the language in the Public Utilities Act arguably would
allow commissioners to more fully incorporate potential environmental impacts into the NCUC decision-making process. Even without
reliance on that provision, decisions regarding coal-fired power plants
in other states demonstrate that commissions can reasonably consider environmental impacts and give more weight to alternative forms
of energy. Commissions in Florida, Oklahoma, and Oregon rejected
utility plans to build new coal-fired power plants due to concerns
about future climate policy compliance costs and failures to adequately consider alternative energy options.110
from New, Modified, and Reconstructed Stationary Sources: Electric Utility Generating
Units, 80 Fed. Reg. 64,510 (Oct. 23, 2015) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 60, 70, 71, 98).
105. Duke Energy Carolinas, 2007 WL 1040917. An IGCC facility converts coal into a
synthetic gas before generating electricity via a gas turbine and a steam turbine. See How
IGCC Works, DUKE ENERGY, http://www.duke-energy.com/about-us/how-igcc-works.asp
(last visited Feb. 27, 2016).
106. Duke Energy Carolinas, 2007 WL 1040917.
107. Id.
108. Public Utilities Act, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 62-2(5) (2014); accord Duke Energy Carolinas, 2007 WL 1040917 (Owens, Jr., Comm’r, dissenting).
109. Duke Energy Carolinas, 2007 WL 1040917.
110. See Fla. Power & Light Co., No. 070098-EI, at 4 (Fla. Pub. Serv. Comm’n July 2,
2007), http://www.psc.state.fl.us/library/filings/07/05350-07/07-0557.ord.doc (finding that
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The Cliffside decision111 demonstrates the limitations of modeling
and the importance of a robust assessment of options. In addition to
the congressional debate over federal climate policy that was underway at the time of the NCUC’s Cliffside decision, the rapid change in
circumstances following the decision calls into question the wisdom of
approving a $1.8 billion112 facility expected to operate for 40 years or
more with known public health impacts and uncertain regulatory
risks. Only four years after the decision, and one year before the new
Cliffside unit became operational, Duke Energy was relying on natural gas units as baseload power, and energy projects suggest that
natural gas prices will remain relatively stable for the foreseeable
future.113 And only seven years after the Cliffside decision, Duke Energy raised concerns about the proposed Clean Power Plan limiting
carbon dioxide emissions from existing power plants pursuant to section 111(d) of the Clean Air Act because it would cause “many [electricity generating unit] owners and operators to abandon or significantly curtail operation of generating units where significant investments have been made to install state-of-the-art control systems to
meet MATS and other air regulations.” 114 The concerns about the
proposed rule creating stranded assets demonstrates the circular
reasoning that may result from a narrow view of the least cost
framework—investment decisions that fail to adequately account for
reasonably foreseeable changes in air quality regulations may lock in
higher emissions, thereby exacerbating air quality issues that result
in regulatory changes while also making the regulatory changes more
expensive than they may have been otherwise. As Duke Energy notes
in its comments, costs associated with stranded assets “are typically

the proposed coal-fired power plant was not the least cost resource due to future costs associated with CO2 emissions); Okla. Gas & Elec. Co., No. PUD 200800059 (Okla. Corp.
Comm’n June 9, 2008); Pacificorp, Order No. 07-018 (Ore. Pub. Util. Comm’n Jan. 16,
2007), http://apps.puc.state.or.us/orders/2007ords/07-018.pdf. For more detail on these and
other examples of state and local agencies rejecting coal-fired power plants, see Patrick
Parenteau, Lead, Follow, or Get Out of the Way: The States Tackle Climate Change with
Little Help from Washington, 40 CONN. L. REV. 1453, 1462-63 (2008).
111. Duke Energy Carolinas, 2007 WL 1040917.
112. Project Overview, DUKE ENERGY, http://www.duke-energy.com/about-us/cliffsideoverview.asp (last visited Feb. 27, 2016).
113. DUKE ENERGY IRP 2012, supra note 55, at 7-10; Environmental Performance
Metrics, DUKE ENERGY, http://sustainabilityreport.duke-energy.com/2011/environmentalfootprint/environmental-performance-metrics/ (last visited Feb. 27, 2016) (showing in the
Table titled “Fuels Consumed for U.S. Electric Generation” that in 2011 coal consumption
decreased while natural gas consumption increased).
114. Duke Energy, Comments on the Proposed Rule on Carbon Pollution Emission
Guidelines for Existing Stationary Sources: Electric Utility Generating Units, 79 Fed. Reg.
34,830, at 197 (Dec. 1, 2014), http://www.ieca-us.com/wp-content/uploads/Duke-EnergyComments_12.01.14.pdf.
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borne by customers in accordance with rates approved by state regulatory commissions,” a particular concern for the NCUC.115
3. Mississippi Power Example: Approval of Retrofitting Existing
Coal-Fired Units to Comply with New Environmental
Regulations
The federal Mercury and Air Toxics Standard (Utility MATS),
promulgated December 2011 pursuant to section 112 of the Clean Air
Act,116 forced many utilities operating older coal-fired power plants to
decide whether to undertake large capital investments to bring existing coal units into compliance with the Act or to retire the facilities
and replace generation needs with natural gas.117 In 2012, the Mississippi PSC faced this circumstance when it considered Mississippi
Power’s proposed $660 million retrofit at the Victor J. Daniel Electric
Generating Facility (“Plant Daniel”) in Jackson County, Mississippi.118 Plant Daniel consists of “two coal units (Units 1 and 2) that
combined are capable of generating approximately 1,020 MW (net
summer peak) of electricity, and two natural gas-fired combined cycle
units (Units 3 and 4) that combined are capable of generating approximately 1,054 MW (net summer peak) of electricity.”119 The PSC
inquiry focused on Units 1 and 2, the newest units in Mississippi
Power’s fleet at the time.120
Mississippi Power acknowledged that additional environmental
regulations were forthcoming, and those regulations would affect the

115. Id.
116. National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants From Coal- and OilFired Electric Utility Steam Generating Units and Standards of Performance for FossilFuel-Fired Electric Utility, Industrial-Commercial- Institutional, and Small IndustrialCommercial-Institutional Steam Generating Units, 77 Fed. Reg. 9304, 9304 (Feb. 16, 2012)
(codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 60, 63 (2015)) [hereinafter Utility MATS]. In 2015, the U.S. Supreme Court determined that the EPA’s failure to consider the compliance costs associated
with limiting mercury emissions from the electric power sector was unreasonable. Michigan v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. 2699 (2015). At the time of publication, the D.C. Circuit had not
decided whether to overturn the Utility MATS rule or keep the rule in place while the EPA
revised its justification for promulgating the regulation. Because this Article relies on Utility MATS as a means of examining PUC decision-making, the outcome of the Utility MATS
rule does not affect the analysis herein.
117. See, e.g., Ky. Power Co., No. 2013-00430, 316 P.U.R. 4th 92 (Ky. P.S.C, Aug. 1,
2014), 2014 WL 3867888 (approving replacing one coal-fired unit with a natural gas turbine); Ky. Power Co., No. 2012-00578, 2013 WL 5592919, at *15 (Ky. Pub. Serv. Comm’n
Oct. 7, 2013) (finding that retrofitting a 1078 MW coal-fired unit to comply with new environmental regulations “is not the lowest cost option”); Miss. Power Co., 2010UA279, 2012
WL 1484068 (Miss. Pub. Serv. Comm’n Apr. 3, 2012) (final certificate order).
118. Miss. Power Co., 2012 WL 1484068, at *5.
119. Id. at *4.
120. Id. (noting that Units 1 and 2 began operating in 1977 and 1981, respectively).
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operation of Plant Daniel’s coal-fired units. The PSC responded by
noting, “[B]ecause of the uncertainty concerning the exact requirements and timing of several impending regulations, the final combination of control technologies that will be needed in addition to the
Scrubber Project cannot be finalized at this time.”121 Mississippi Power informed the commission that the scrubbers must be installed prior to any additional environmental controls that may ultimately be
required at Plant Daniel.122 The Company expected to file for a separate certificate for additional controls once more information became
available concerning the other potential environmental controls that
may be required for continued operation of the coal-fired units. Rather than hedging against the potential for future CO2 emission limits, Mississippi Power argued that investing in Plant Daniel to comply with Utility MATS would “allow the Company to mitigate the risk
to the existing fleet of future CO2 compliance cost by allowing additional time for greater certainty about CO2 regulations before committing to expensive environmental controls on the remainder of
the fleet.”123
The commission relied on the utility’s economic modeling demonstrating that the retrofit option was the most cost-effective, finding
that additional modeling by the Mississippi Public Utilities Staff to
evaluate the decision under different future fuel price and policy scenarios was inconclusive.124 The commission also considered fuel diversity, noting that opting to retire the units rather than retrofit
them would result in natural gas making up seventy-one percent of
the utility’s energy mix. 125 In the end, the PSC placed “superior
weight” on the retrofit option’s benefits regarding fuel diversity and
fuel security and determined that high CO2 prices are not likely.126
A dissenting commissioner argued that retrofitting the units was
the wrong decision, questioning the concerns about overreliance on
natural gas and the hedging strategies of the firm.127 The dissent asserted that Mississippi Power’s analysis of its options was “based on

121. Id. at *6.
122. Id. (“The Company expects to file for a separate certificate for additional controls
once more information is available concerning the other potential environmental controls
that may be required for continued operation of Units 1 and 2 at Plant Daniel.”).
123. Id. at *8.
124. Id. at *7-8.
125. Id. at *7 (finding “the strategic interest of fuel diversity very compelling and gives
significant weight to this consideration”).
126. Id. at *9.
127. Miss. Power Co., 2010UA279, 2012 WL 1484069 (Miss. Pub. Serv. Comm’n Apr. 4,
2012) (Presley, Comm’r, concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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severe overestimations of future natural gas prices which naturally
favored installation of scrubbers at Daniel.” 128 According to the
dissent:
The primary strategic argument for the scrubbers is that the retention of coal in [Mississippi Power’s] fuel mix achieves fuel diversity as protection from natural gas price volatility. As pointed
out in the record, this again misstates a key issue. While diversity
of generation is obviously important, its value is as a hedge
against skyrocketing natural gas prices where the only alternative
is natural gas fired generation. With the realization of gas prices
as high as [Mississippi Power] predicts unlikely, and with a stable
of alternatives as discussed above, the value of this hedging component diminishes. It diminishes so much, in fact, that the capital
investment required to achieve diversity will eclipse any costs this
diversity has avoided.
Finally, [Mississippi Power] argues that the Daniel Units 1 and
2 must be retained as necessary baseload units. However, the term
“baseload unit” is not synonymous with “coal-fired unit.” When
economics dictate, natural gas units can serve as baseload resources. In fact, Plant Daniel itself demonstrates this as its gas
units have provided baseload power over the last two years where
the coal units have not.129

The dissent also criticized the notion that investing in the $660
million scrubbers “pre-certif[ied] future ratepayer investment in the
company and . . . continue[d] to put the Commission in a box” by
admitting:
[T]he scrubbers will be the first in a series of capital intensive environmental compliance requirements for Daniel Units 1 & 2 if
they are to continue operation. . . .
The conclusion that the public interest is only satisfied by approving the Daniel Scrubbers is based on false economic and strategic premises that misguided the debate. The decision in this case
followed a trail of logic that was off target from the start. Therefore, the Commission arrived at the wrong destination. In convincing the majority that this path was correct, MPC has successfully
set up another Kemper situation in which this or future Commissions will be forced to choose between allowing a “too big to fail” financial disaster for one of its utilities or placing the burden of its
rescue on utility customers.130

128. Id. at *1 (relying on data from U.S. EIA and NYMEX).
129. Id. at *2.
130. Id. at *3.
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The majority and dissenting opinions provide a stark contract
when considering the bounds of prudency and least cost in a PSC
proceeding. By noting the likelihood of more stringent environmental
regulations in the future, the commission’s majority considered least
cost over time rather than taking a static view of least cost based on
the laws and regulations in place at the time. However, the PSC did
not engage in robust analysis of the future costs, instead relying on
assertions by Mississippi Power. At the same time, the commission
also noted the option’s value of investing in the scrubbers in the nearterm as a strategy to preserve options in the future.131 In contrast,
the dissent placed more faith in natural gas prices remaining relatively low and thus dismissed concerns about maintaining fuel diversity. By criticizing Mississippi Power’s acceptance of additional costs
arising from future environmental regulations, the dissent also implicitly argued for hedging regulatory risk by choosing an option that
is more likely to avoid future costs.
4. Appalachian Power Company Example: Rejection of a New
IGCC Plant
A 2007 proposal by Appalachian Power Company (APCo), an
American Electric Power (AEP) subsidiary, to construct a coal-fired
IGCC plant provides a further look at different interpretations of the
least cost mandate. APCo, whose service territory spans portions of
West Virginia and Virginia, proposed construction a 629 MW coalfired IGCC facility in West Virginia.132 The utility justified its proposal based on the potential to capture carbon emissions in the event
the U.S. Congress adopted new legislation requiring emission decreases.133 The project required separate approval from the commission in each state before moving forward with the $2.23 billion project, but it only received approval from the West Virginia PSC.134 The
Virginia State Corporation Commission (SCC) denied APCo’s bid for
approval, preventing the project from moving forward.135
131. Miss. Power Co., 2010UA279, 2012 WL 1484068, at *8 (Miss. Pub. Serv. Comm’n
Apr. 3, 2012); see infra Section III.B for further discussion of options value.
132. Appalachian Power Co., No. PUE-2007-00068, 2008 S.C.C. Ann Rept. 405 (Va.
State Corp. Comm’n Apr. 14, 2008), 2008 WL 1778119 (final order); Appalachian Power
Co., No. 06-0033-E-CN, at 1 (W. Va. Pub. Serv. Comm’n Mar. 6, 2008) (comm’n order).
133. Appalachian Power Co., 2008 WL 1778119, at *3.
134. Appalachian Power Co., 263 P.U.R. 4th 297 (W. Va. Pub. Serv. Comm’n Mar. 6,
2008), 2008 WL 1758812.
135. Appalachian Power Co., 2008 WL 1778119, at *2 (denying APCo’s application for a
rate adjustment clause). The project would cost 40–105% more than a similar size pulverized coal facility. Id. at *3. APCo’s filings indicated that the firm planned to seek federal
funding to cover a portion of the construction costs. Id.; see Appalachian Power Fact Sheet:
Carbon Dioxide Capture and Storage Project, CARBON CAPTURE & SEQUESTRATION TECHS.
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Despite the project’s cost, the West Virginia Commission was persuaded in part because it would
enable APCo to continue to use native coal for the Project’s expected life in a way that will provide superior thermal efficiency,
will enable APCo to achieve significant reductions over the environmental impacts of the conventional coal combustion and will facilitate compliance with the constraints imposed by expected future environmental regulations.136

After accounting for the cost of future environmental regulations,
the PSC found that the cost of electricity from the IGCC plant would
be less than that from a new pulverized coal unit.137
The Virginia SCC came to the opposite conclusion from its counterpart in West Virginia, finding that the IGCC facility was “neither
reasonable nor prudent.”138 The SCC questioned the viability of the
technology and the accuracy of the cost projections.139 The commission also dismissed the regulatory hedging value of the new plant
because future CO2 emission limits were too uncertain.140
Similar to the KY Power and Mississippi Power examples, the
Virginia and West Virginia Commissions offer opposing views of regulatory risk and the degree of certainty necessary to justify rate increases. The APCo IGCC case also provides an example of the direct
relationship between the views of commissioners and deployment of
new energy technologies, as well as the challenge of deploying technologies that may present diffuse societal benefits but high
localized costs.141
The group of PUC cases described in this subpart highlight the
predominant role that near-term cost considerations play in a PUC
proceeding, despite the fact that the dissenting opinions in the Kentucky Power, Duke Energy, and Mississippi Power examples and the
different approaches of the two state commissions in the APCo example suggest that alternative views were possible under the respective state laws. Taken together, the cases demonstrate conflicting
views of costs, risks, and benefits that may arise in a least cost inquiry and the subjectivity inherent in PUC decision-making. The
@ MIT, http://sequestration.mit.edu/tools/projects/appalachian_power.html (last visited
Feb. 27, 2016).
136. Appalachian Power Co., 2008 WL 1758812.
137. Id.
138. Appalachian Power Co., 2008 WL 1778119, at *2.
139. Id. at *3-6.
140. Id. at *7-8.
141. Jonas J. Monast & Sarah K. Adair, Completing the Energy Innovation Cycle: The
View from the Public Utility Commission, 65 HASTINGS L.J. 1345, 1381-83 (2014).
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cases also demonstrate that choices regarding which variables to consider and how much weight to give each variable have a direct influence on the outcome. Each example reveals that reasonable commissioners may disagree regarding which risks to consider, how those
risks relate to one another, and which alternatives are viable choices
for the regulated utilities. These cases also highlight the difficulty of
assessing and responding to policy uncertainty, leading many commissions to evaluate utility needs based on laws on the books at
the time.
B. Uncertainty, Irreversibility, and Inherent Value Choices
The U.S. electricity sector is in the early phase of a major and
costly transition that will ultimately result in the replacement of
much of the nation’s electricity infrastructure by the middle of the
twenty-first century, including replacing the fleet of existing power
plants, further incorporating renewable energy technologies, and
transitioning the electricity grid to a digital system.142 The resulting
capital costs and projected minimal electricity demand growth during
this time creates the potential for significant cost increases in electricity rates.143 While the transition will occur over a period of decades, a series of near-term factors will directly affect private sector
investments and the sector’s long-term emissions trajectory, including fuel prices, technology advancements, and regulatory requirements. PUCs will play a central role in managing this transition.
Electricity markets were relatively predictable from the early-tomid 1980s until recently. Coal prices were generally stable, while
natural gas prices were characterized by wide price swings in the
1990s and early 2000s.144 Electricity generation options were limited,
with pulverized coal plants and nuclear plants offering viable options
for dependable, affordable baseload power. 145 Natural gas turbines
142. See, e.g., JONAS MONAST & DAVID HOPPOCK, NICHOLAS INST. FOR ENVTL. POLICY
SOLS., DUKE UNIV., DESIGNING CO2 PERFORMANCE STANDARDS FOR A TRANSITIONING
ELECTRICITY SECTOR: A MULTI-BENEFITS FRAMEWORK 11068 (2014); THE FUTURE OF THE
ELECTRIC GRID: AN INTERDISCIPLINARY MIT STUDY (2011), http://mitei.mit.edu/system/
files/Electric_Grid_Full_Report.pdf.
143. Annual Energy Outlook 2015: Executive Summary, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN.
(Apr. 14, 2015), http://www.eia.gov/forecasts/aeo/executive_summary.cfm (“Rising costs for
electric power generation, transmission, and distribution, coupled with relatively slow
growth of electricity demand, produce an 18% increase in the average retail price of electricity over the period from 2013 to 2040 in the AEO2015 Reference case.”).
144. Table 7.9 Coal Prices, Selected Years, 1949-2011, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN.
(2011), http://www.eia.gov/totalenergy/data/annual/pdf/sec7_21.pdf; U.S. Natural Gas
Wellhead Price, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN. (Dec. 31, 2014), http://www.eia.gov/dnav/ng/
hist/n9190us3m.htm.
145. U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., ANNUAL ENERGY OUTLOOK 2014 WITH PROJECTIONS TO
2040, at IF-34 (2014), www.eia.gov/forecasts/archive/aeo14/pdf/0383(2014).pdf (finding that
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and oil-fired boilers provided intermediate and peak power due to
their ability to ramp up or down based on electricity demand and the
higher fuel costs.146 Solar and wind power were unable to compete on
a cost basis and relied on subsidies and mandates.147 Existing power
plants were exempt from many of the new environmental regulations
that emerged in the early 1970s.148 Electricity demand was generally
predictable, with the notable exception of the decline in demand in
the late 1970s and early 1980s.149 This drop in demand, due to an
economic recession and the difficulties utilities encountered with financing and permitting of nuclear power plants in the aftermath of
the Three Mile Island accident, led to cancelled projects that resulted
in over $15 billion in stranded costs that were largely borne by
ratepayers.150
A range of economic, technical, and regulatory factors are driving
profound shifts in the U.S. electricity sector, creating a complex matrix of risks that electric generators and regulators must understand
and address. For example, the shale gas boom has led to a rapid drop
in natural gas prices, and current projections from the U.S. Energy
Information Administration and NYMEX futures prices suggest that
the average price per mmBtu could remain relatively stable for at
least a decade or more.151 In the near term, the low fuel cost makes
“[i]n 2012, coal-fired and nuclear power plants together provided 56% of the electricity
generated in the United States” and noting that nuclear and coal operate as baseload
power).
146. See Natural Gas-Fired Combustion Turbines Are Generally Used to Meet Peak
Electricity Load, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN. (Oct. 1, 2013), http://www.eia.gov/
todayinenergy/detail.cfm?id=13191.
147. See, e.g., U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., ANNUAL ENERGY OUTLOOK 2008 WITH
PROJECTIONS TO 2030, at 70 (2008), http://www.eia.gov/oiaf/aeo/pdf/0383%282008%29.pdf
(noting that the modeling reference case projects “the growth potential of wind power,
which depends on a variety of factors, including fossil fuel costs, State renewable energy
programs, technology improvements, access to transmission grids, public concerns about
environmental and other impacts, and the future of the Federal PTC [(Production Tax
Credit)]” and that “[s]olar technologies in general remain too costly for grid-connected
applications, but demonstration programs and State policies support some growth in central-station solar PV, and small-scale customer-sited PV applications grow rapidly”).
148. See Jonathan Remy Nash & Richard L. Revesz, Grandfathering and Environmental Regulation: The Law and Economics of New Source Review, 101 NW. U. L. REV. 1677,
1681-96 (2007).
149. Pierce, supra note 26, at 502-03.
150. See Joseph P. Tomain & Constance Dowd Burton, Nuclear Transition: From Three
Mile Island to Chernobyl, 28 WM. & MARY L. REV. 363, 377-78 (1987) (citing ENERGY INFO.
ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, NUCLEAR PLANT CANCELLATIONS: CAUSES, COSTS, AND
CONSEQUENCES ch. 2 (1983)).
151. See Henry Hub Natural Gas Futures Settlements, CME GROUP,
http://www.cmegroup.com/trading/energy/natural-gas/natural-gas_quotes_settlements_
futures.html (last visited Feb. 27, 2016) (showing natural gas futures prices settling at,
$2.654 for Sept. 2020 futures and $2.916 for Dec. 2027 futures); see also Natural Gas Consumption Has Two Peaks Each Year, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN. (July 1, 2011),

2015]

MAXIMIZING UTILITY

171

natural gas a likely option for new electricity generation.152 However,
because it is early in the shale gas boom, long-term price projections
may be inaccurate. Historically, natural gas has displayed significant
price volatility, and long-term price projections have been frequently
proven unreliable.153 Because the levelized operating cost for a natural gas plant is largely determined by fuel costs, as opposed to a coal
plant or a nuclear plant where the cost is largely driven by construction costs, volatility in natural gas prices over the lifetime of a facility
could result in significant rate spikes in areas with growing reliance
on natural gas generation.154
Despite the prospect of long-term natural gas price volatility, new
coal-fired generation in the United States is unlikely. Even before the
rapid expansion of shale gas production and the resulting drop in
natural gas prices, energy projections suggested that there would be
little or no new coal-fired generation built in the foreseeable future,155
with any increases in coal-fired generation resulting from increased
dispatch from existing units. Coal’s competitive advantage compared
to natural gas was a result of the fuel price being relatively cheap
and stable, a competitive advantage that is undermined by the dramatic increase of economically viable natural gas reserves in the
United States due to horizontal drilling and hydraulic fracturing
technologies.156 The shift from higher average prices to lower average
prices puts the cost of generating electricity from a natural gas-fired
facility on par with that of a coal-fired facility.157 The increasing costs
http://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.cfm?id=2050 (showing cyclical increases in NYMEX
futures prices are due to increased winter demand).
152. U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., ANNUAL ENERGY OUTLOOK 2015 WITH PROJECTIONS TO
2040, at 8-9 (2015), http://www.eia.gov/forecasts/aeo/pdf/0383%282015%29.pdf.
153. The rapid emergence of economically viable shale gas resources may limit price
volatility moving forward. See, e.g., Natural Gas Prices Drop Following Strong Production
Growth, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN. (Jan. 28, 2015), http://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/
detail.cfm?id=19751; U.S. Crude Oil and Natural Gas Proved Reserves, U.S. ENERGY INFO.
ADMIN., http://www.eia.gov/naturalgas/crudeoilreserves/archive/2013/index.cfm (last updated Dec. 19, 2014) (finding that “[a] sharp increase in proved natural gas reserves in
2013 more than offset the significant decline experienced in 2012, and set a new record
(354 trillion cubic feet) for U.S. natural gas proved reserves”) (footnote omitted).
154. See Levelized Cost and Levelized Avoided Cost of New Generation Resources in the
Annual Energy Outlook 2015, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN. (June 3, 2015),
http://www.eia.gov/forecasts/aeo/electricity_generation.cfm [hereinafter Levelized Cost].
155. See Steve James, Feature-US Coal-Fired Power Plant Plans up in Smoke?
REUTERS
(Mar.
4,
2007),
http://www.reuters.com/article/2007/03/04/coal-poweridUSN0232700720070304.
156. See U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., ANNUAL ENERGY OUTLOOK 2013 WITH
PROJECTIONS TO 2040, at 39-42, 79 (2013), http://www.eia.gov/forecasts/archive/aeo13/pdf/
0383%282013%29.pdf.
157. Electric Generator Dispatch Depends on System Demand and the Relative Cost of
Operation, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN. (Aug. 17, 2012), http://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/
detail.cfm?id=7590.
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of operating coal-fired power plants and the prospect of increasing
stringency on emissions of CO2 and other air pollutants not only
make new coal-fired generation unlikely, these factors also raise
questions about the viability of the nation’s existing fleet of coal-fired
power plants.
Uncertainty regarding the nation’s existing fleet of nuclear power
plants highlights the emergence of yet another vexing issue facing
electric utilities and their regulators. The operating permits for the
majority of the nation’s nuclear power plants will expire in the
2030s, 158 forcing utilities and regulators to decide between seeking
permit extensions and retiring facilities before plants reach the end
of their operating license. 159 With the average ten to twelve year
planning horizon to construct a new nuclear plant, operators and
regulators will need to determine whether to replace facilities with
new nuclear generation before the end of the decade. Factors such as
natural gas prices, climate policy, uncertainty regarding electricity
demand growth, and concerns about price volatility and fuel diversity
will play important roles in the decision-making process.
The electricity sector will face increased infrastructure expenditures independent of generation decisions in order to respond to the
need for new transmission lines and smart grid improvements.160 If
electricity demand remains stagnant, utilities will likely have to
raise rates in order to recover the costs of new infrastructure, potentially further depressing demand. Flat demand can also raise questions regarding whether to undertake major capital projects because
there may not be the need for the capacity once the facility is completed, potentially resulting in underutilized or stranded assets and
consumers paying higher prices to compensate the utilities for poor
158. See Almost All U.S. Nuclear Plants Require Life Extension Past 60 Years to Operate Beyond 2050, ENERGY INFO. ADMIN. (Dec. 8, 2014), http://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/
detail.cfm?id=19091(explaining that the bulk of existing nuclear power plants were licensed before 1990 and that an operating license issued by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is good for a period of forty years).
159. Many of these nuclear units have already received one license extension from the
NRC. Id. (noting that the NRC has granted twenty-year license renewals to 74 out of the
100 operating reactors in the United States).
160. For example, the Brattle Group has estimated that the sector will spend between
$120–$160 billion per decade on new transmission through 2030. JOHANNES
PFEIFENBERGER ET AL., THE BRATTLE GROUP, INVESTMENT TRENDS AND FUNDAMENTALS IN
US TRANSMISSION AND ELECTRICITY INFRASTRUCTURE 11 (2015), http://www.brattle.com/
system/news/pdfs/000/000/904/original/Investment_Trends_and_Fundamentals_in_US_
Transmission_and_Electricity_Infrastructure.pdf?1437424727. A 2012 Deloitte report estimates that investments in new electricity generation will reach $150 billion in the same
time period, while smart grid investments between 2012–2015 could amount to $4.4–$11.6
billion. GREGORY ALIFF, DELOITTE, THE MATH DOES NOT LIE: FACTORING THE FUTURE OF
THE U.S. ELECTRIC POWER INDUSTRY 4 (2012), http://www2.deloitte.com/content/dam/Deloitte/
global/Documents/Energy-and-Resources/dttl-er-themathdoesnotlie-08082013.pdf.
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planning decisions. The history of unfinished nuclear power plants in
the aftermath of the 1970s recession and the Three Mile Island nuclear disaster offer a cautionary tale for regulators considering large
capital expenditures during a period of significant uncertainty.161
However, a decision-maker cannot freeze in the face of uncertainty. Investments must be made to maintain reliable electricity service.
How to do so, what costs are incurred by various options, and who
pays those costs all raise unavoidable value choices. The strategies by
which electric utilities and their regulators address these uncertainties will determine the trajectory of electricity rates and the sector’s
environmental impacts for decades to come.
Uncertainty is not a new challenge for the electricity sector, as
utility executives and regulators have long had to grapple with the
prospect of changes in technology, fuel prices, and regulation. However, the scope and scale of uncertainties, and the fact that these factors are converging at the same time that utilities are retiring large
numbers of older coal-fired power plants and determining whether
and how to replace the retiring generation, present a particularly
challenging decision-making environment for current PUCs.
Compounding the challenges associated with regulatory decisionmaking in the face of uncertainty is the fact that capital investments
for generation decisions are irreversible.162 The current U.S. electricity infrastructure primarily depends upon large power plants to generate electricity. Initial capital investments can range from approximately $1000–$1400 per kilowatt for new natural gas combined cycle
units, and approximately $2800–$5700 per kilowatt for a new nuclear unit.163 Once those investments are made, either the shareholders
or ratepayers must pay.164 Risk allocation is a key difference between
a typical investment by a corporate actor facing market competition
and an investment by a rate-regulated electric utility. Once a PUC

161. See Pierce, supra note 26, at 504-05.
162. See, e.g., Miss. Power Co., 2010UA279, 2012 WL 1484068, at *8 (Miss. Pub. Serv.
Comm’n Apr. 3, 2012) (final certificate order) (noting that installing a scrubber to comply
with Utility MATS “was largely ‘irreversible,’ because a decision to control would dictate
that future environmental controls be added and, further, because Daniel is the newest
coal units, a decision not to control would likely lead to similar decisions with respect to the
remaining coal units in [Mississippi Power’s] fleet”).
163. KAPLAN, supra note 73, at 79-83 (listing project costs for proposed and completed
nuclear and natural gas combined cycle projects). The text uses price-per-kilowatt to provide a common unit for comparison due to variation in the size of projects. See id. The total
project costs range from $330 million to $9.9 billion, with net summer capacity ranging
from 300 to 2700 megawatts. Id.
164. See, e.g., Jersey Cent. Power & Light Co. v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n, 730
F.2d 816 (1984) (considering how to allocate costs incurred for a nuclear unit that did not
become operational).
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incorporates a utility investment into the rate base, the commission
must set rates at a level that allows the utility’s investors to recoup
their investments plus a rate of return.165
The combination of uncertainty and irreversibility are distinctive
risks facing commissioners overseeing rate-regulated industries, such
as vertically-regulated electric utilities.166 At the same time, the latitude available to utility commissioners creates an opportunity to address a wide range of societal impacts resulting from electricity generation. Conversely, failure to take an expansive view of the factors
that contribute to long-term costs associated with operating various
types of power plants could result in the PUCs failing to achieve the
least cost mandate that underlies so much of their decision-making
processes. Furthermore, rigid adherence to the narrow view of constrained least cost could frustrate the tripartite aims of affordability,
reliability, and allowing reasonable returns on investment.
IV. MAXIMIZING UTILITY THROUGH THE LEAST COST
FRAMEWORK: FROM THEORY TO PRACTICE
The premise that PUC decision-making is, at its core, an attempt
at maximizing societal utility calls for a critical assessment of the
scope of the regulatory process. Whose utility is the regulatory process attempting to maximize, and relatedly, is the goal overall utility
or utility among a narrow band of criteria? The impacts of an electric
utility’s decision may be felt across a utility’s service territory, a
state, a region, the nation, or the globe. For example, reliance on
cheap electricity from coal throughout the twentieth century resulted
in high levels of mercury emissions, which are known to cause severe
neurological impacts; sulfur dioxide and nitrogen oxides emissions,
which are known to contribute to respiratory problems and to be the
leading cause of acid rain;167 and greenhouse gas emissions,168 which
are known contributors to global climate change.169 These impacts not
165. Bluefield Water Works & Improvement Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of W. Va., 262
U.S. 679, 692-93 (1923).
166. Cass R. Sunstein, Irreversible and Catastrophic, 91 CORNELL L. REV. 841, 842-43
(2006).
167. See Health, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, http://www3.epa.gov/airquality/
sulfurdioxide/health.html (last visited Feb. 27, 2016); What is Acid Rain?, U.S. ENVTL.
PROT. AGENCY, http://www3.epa.gov/acidrain/what/index.html (last visited Feb. 27, 2016).
168. See generally U.S. Greenhouse Gas Inventory Report: 1990–2013, U.S. ENVTL.
PROT. AGENCY, http://www.epa.gov/climatechange/ghgemissions/usinventoryreport.html
(last visited Feb. 27, 2016) (providing an overview of greenhouse gas emissions in the U.S.
and sources of greenhouse gas emissions).
169. Causes of Climate Change, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, http://www3.epa.gov/
climatechange/science/causes.html (last updated Nov. 4, 2015); INTERGOVERNMENTAL
PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE CHANGE 2014 SYNTHESIS REPORT 44-47,
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only affect public health and the environment, but also may lead to
more stringent regulations to reduce the impacts and therefore higher compliance costs for facilities emitting these pollutants. The financial impacts may also ripple well beyond the rates charged to consumers, potentially affecting a region’s ability to attract new businesses as well as the value of retirement funds that are invested
heavily in investor-owned utilities (IOUs) based on the expectation
that these IOUs provide reliable returns.
Reasonable and responsible risk hedging can mitigate the potential for significant rate increases resulting from future regulations
and fuel price volatility, while also reducing near-term public health
and environmental impacts. Conversely, failure to fully consider the
risk of changing circumstances affecting generation costs can have
serious negative economic and environmental impacts. Depending on
the factors commissions consider and the weight assigned to each factor, they may conclude that new generation is necessary and that
higher or lower cost alternatives are more appropriate to meet demand and satisfy other important variables. Alternatively, commissions may conclude that the preferable action is to delay a major investment by reducing demand through energy efficiency or demand
response. Investing in smaller scale generation options in the nearterm may also provide an attractive option in some situations, as the
approach may allow commissions to wait for more data to become
available regarding the trajectory of natural gas prices or allow new
technologies such as utility-scale energy storage options time to develop.170 An option that often is not available to the PUC is simply
refusing to make a decision, requiring the commission to rely upon
the best information available at the time.
The following Sections describe three options for expanding the
scope of utility planning and utility commission oversight by pursuing a “minimum regret” strategy through a robust assessment of potential future scenarios affecting the electric utility sector; seeking
options that result in multiple benefits for the electricity sector, its
stakeholders, and society as a whole; and shifting a higher degree of
risk to utility investors to further motivate risk hedging by the firms.

http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-report/ar5/syr/AR5_SYR_FINAL_All_Topics.pdf
(last
visited Feb. 27, 2016).
170. See David Hoppock & Dalia Patino Echeverri, Using Energy Efficiency to Hedge
Natural Gas Price Uncertainty, NICHOLAS INST. FOR ENVTL. POLICY SOLUTIONS (2013),
https://nicholasinstitute.duke.edu/sites/default/files/publications/ni_wp_13-02.pdf.
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A. Maximizing Utility by Minimizing Regret
The range of scenarios considered and the assumptions regarding
future electricity demand, technology, fuel prices, and regulation will
directly influence the outcome of a PUC proceeding. Given the rampant uncertainties currently facing the electricity sector, there is an
increased likelihood that PUC decisions could result in higher costs
over the lifetime of a facility due to retrofits to comply with new regulatory requirements, stranded costs due to early retirement of a facility, or both. Near-term decisions based on current technologies may
also fail to take advantage of lower cost alternatives that emerge over
time. Explicitly assessing how alternatives compare on multiple objectives could help utilities and regulators identify investment alternatives on both cost and non-cost objectives that are likely to result
in the broadest range of societal benefits.171 Increasing transparency
regarding the value choices inherent in the planning process can elucidate those inherent choices and also demonstrate the breadth of
options available under the least cost framework.
The integrated resource plan (IRP) process, implemented in approximately half of the states, is perhaps the most direct attempt at a
utility maximization approach. IRPs generally require electric utilities to explain to the PUC how they expect the electricity sector to
change over time and identify plans for addressing the changes, although the processes differ significantly regarding the level of analysis and transparency.172 While many commentators point to the bene171. The elements of a robust electric utility planning process closely resemble the
seven-step “felicific calculus” that Bentham proposed as a means to evaluate alterative
courses of action: intensity (i.e., how strong is the pleasure or pain); duration (i.e., how long
will the pleasure or pain last); certainty (i.e., how certain is the actor that the pleasure or
pain will occur); propinquity (i.e., how soon will the pleasure or pain occur); fecundity (i.e.,
will the action lead to similar pleasures or pains in the future); purity (i.e., how pure is the
pleasure or pain); and extent (i.e., what is the net impact of the action). BENTHAM, supra
note 8, at 3. Although Bentham used different language than contemporary utility planners and regulators, there are direct analogies between the elements of the calculus and
the multiple variables that will determine the long-term cost of electricity and impacts of
the system. See id. Mill refined Bentham’s approach by noting that maximizing utility is
not simply a quantitative exercise, adding up pleasures on one side and pains on the other.
As Mill explained, some pleasures are more desirable than others and, conversely, some
pains less desirable than others. In addition, some pleasures and pains are impossible to
compare with one another. For example, intellectual pleasures and physical pains occur on
different planes. J. S. MILL, UTILITARIANISM 57 (Roger Crisp ed., 1998) (“It is better to be a
human being dissatisfied than a pig satisfied; better to be Socrates dissatisfied than a fool
satisfied.”). Similarly, PUCs may view some factors as more important than others, such as
prioritizing reliability over environmental protection. See, e.g., N. AM. ELEC. RELIABILITY
CORP., POTENTIAL RELIABILITY IMPACTS OF EPA’S PROPOSED CLEAN POWER PLAN (2014),
http://www.nerc.com/pa/RAPA/ra/Reliability%20Assessments%20DL/Potential_Reliability_
Impacts_of_EPA_Proposed_CPP_Final.pdf.
172. The IRP concept has its roots in the Public Utilities Regulatory Policies Act
(PURPA). 16 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2645 (2012). PURPA established federal standards that,
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fits of the IRP process, 173 the approach has not enjoyed universal
support. For example, when efforts to implement IRP requirements
and efforts to restructure electricity markets were in their early
phases, Black and Pierce contrasted the “deregulatory trend” that
“relies where possible on markets, private incentives, and decentralized decisions to produce optimal pricing and consumption of electric
power and least-cost pollution control” with “faith in central planning
(‘integrated resource planning’ is the new phrase)” and observed that
IRP “bears an uncomfortable resemblance to the systems previously
used to govern the economies of eastern Europe and the former
Soviet Union.”174
Such dire predictions about IRPs ushering in Soviet-era regulation
for the U.S. electricity sector have proven unfounded, and there remain open questions regarding the pros and cons of restructuring
electricity markets. Instead, IRPs can be an important tool in the effort to assess risks and impacts of electricity generation choices, but
there are limits to the IRP process as conducted in many states.
PUCs may lack the resources to perform independent verification,
and nongovernmental stakeholders may therefore have difficulty engaging in the planning process. The process also depends on assumptions about future demand, fuel prices, and technology prices that
may or may not prove to be accurate in the long run. Electric utilities
often conduct the analysis using proprietary modeling tools that are
not made available for PUC staff or stakeholders to test different assumptions. Commissions may also have limited opportunity to question the utility. Finally, utilities may have a disincentive to highlight
scenarios that conflict with the firm’s goals.
Despite these potential shortcomings, there are examples of IRP
processes that consider a wider range of potential scenarios regarding economics, technology, and regulation. The process developed by
the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) is a particularly robust effort
to identify optimal planning pathways for the next twenty years after
though not mandatory, “would evolve into ‘integrated resource planning’ by the industry,
where both generating facilities and load management/conservation techniques would be
weighed in developing least-cost electricity services.” Rudy Perkins, Electricity Deregulation, Environmental Externalities and the Limitations of Price, 39 B.C. L. REV. 903, 1004
(1998).
173. See, e.g., Inara Scott, Teaching an Old Dog New Tricks: Adapting Public Utility
Commissions to Meet Twenty-First Century Climate Challenges, 38 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV.
371, 409-10 (2014) (“Integrated resource planning is a powerful tool that can be used to
weigh options for the future of the utility system. Planners can assess the long-term cost
and reliability impacts of different transmission paths, distributed generation, renewable
resources, and technology like the smart grid.”).
174. Bernard S. Black & Richard J. Pierce, Jr., The Choice Between Markets and Central Planning in Regulating the U.S. Electricity Industry, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 1339, 1341-42
(1993).
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considering a range of potential scenarios.175 TVA defines the purpose
of its resource planning as “[t]he application of economic and engineering analyses to the resource adequacy problem . . . specifically
making investment decisions to minimize fixed and variable costs,
while maintaining appropriate resource adequacy.”176 This is a variant on the least cost approach followed by many state PUCs. Characterized as a “no-regrets” approach, the TVA IRP process considers
cost, financial risk, environmental stewardship, macro economic effects, and flexibility by evaluating numerous planning strategies
across seven potential future scenarios. 177 TVA employees solicit
stakeholder feedback on the range of scenarios included in the IRP
process, and TVA summarizes the results in a scorecard that is easily
accessible to the lay audience.178 Together, these variables allow TVA
“to make the best decisions in a dynamic, ever-changing regulatory
and economic environment.”179
Despite the robust planning and the explicit consideration of environmental impacts, the TVA’s “no-regrets” planning process did not
lead to the conclusion that it should retire all coal-fired generation.
As recently as December 2014, the TVA directors opted to retrofit two
134 MW coal-fired units located in Kentucky for a cost of $185 mil-

175. TVA is not subject to state PUC oversight.
176. TENN. VALLEY AUTH., EXPLORING LEAST-REGRETS RESOURCE PLANNING: A FORUM
ON MODELING FOR LONG-RANGE POWER SUPPLY STUDIES 3 (2014); Dallas Burtraw et al.,
Reliability in the U.S. Electricity Industry Under New Environmental Regulations, 62
ENERGY POL’Y 1078 (2013).
177. TENN. VALLEY AUTH., INTEGRATED RESOURCE PLAN: TVA’S ENVIRONMENTAL &
ENERGY FUTURE 13-14 (2011), http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML1217/ML12171A189.pdf.
TVA defines a “no-regrets” process as one
in which all relevant and available information was analyzed in a careful and
considered fashion, with significant attention paid to what would happen if the
future unfolds in an unexpected way.
In other words, strategic options were analyzed not only from the perspective of what was expected to occur in the future, but also from the perspective
of what was possible to occur in the future. Using this framework, decisions
made today and in the near future are not overly dependent on the future unfolding exactly as expected. Therefore, this IRP should provide benefit and value to stakeholders even if the future turns out to be different than predicted.
Id. at 13; see also GARY BRINKWORTH, TENN. VALLEY AUTH., TVA’S 2015 IRP: MORE THAN A
LEAST COST ENERGY PLAN (2014), http://www.aaes.auburn.edu/water/resources/Presentations/
2014%20AL%20WR%20Conference/documents/3-Brinkworth-IRPoverviewALwaterconf0903a.
pdf (summarizing the IRP framework).
178. See TENN. VALLEY AUTH., supra note 177, at 102-03; see also BRINKWORTH, supra
note 177, at 13 (noting that resource plans are scored using a particular set of metrics reflected in the scorecard design).
179. TENN. VALLEY AUTH., supra note 177, at 10.
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lion.180 It does, however, more fully evaluate the costs and societal
impacts of resource decisions, allowing decision-makers to better understand the potential outcomes of their actions.
Commissions wishing to take the broadest view of scenario analysis to develop a comprehensive evaluation of electric utility investments and their impacts could consider the following factors: the potential worst-case scenarios; the expected lifetime of a facility; the
degree of uncertainty that could affect an investment’s costs and impacts; how soon a decision must be made; and the potential for the
investment to restrict choices in the future.181 Undertaking such a
broad analysis in a transparent fashion can elucidate the choices inherent in the process, demonstrate the breadth of options available
under the least cost framework, and allow affected stakeholders to
develop informed views regarding the future of a state’s electricity
sector.
Evaluation of worst-case scenarios may consider a range of factors
relevant to the least cost inquiry, including costs associated with constructing and operating a facility, the potential impacts on system
reliability, and the potential impacts on public health and the environment. The analysis may also consider the costs that could arise if
unanticipated changes occur during the lifetime of the facility. The
billions of dollars associated with abandoned nuclear construction
projects in the 1980s are a prime example of the intensity consideration.182 The drop in electricity demand that contributed to the decisions to abandon the nuclear projects also resulted in unfinished
natural gas-fired facilities, but at a fraction of the cost.183
The degree of exposure to changing circumstances depends in
large part on the expected lifetime of a facility. The longer a facility
remains in operation, the more likely it is that new technologies will
emerge that can generate electricity at a lower cost, reduce environmental impacts, or both. Regulatory requirements affecting energy
production and delivery will change over time, and more stringent
environmental regulations will likely be promulgated over time as
180. Dave Flessner, $185 Million OK’d by TVA to Upgrade Kentucky Coal Plant, TIMES
FREE PRESS (Dec. 31, 2014), http://www.timesfreepress.com/news/business/aroundregion/
story/2014/dec/31/185-million-okd-tva-upgrade-kentucky-coal-plant/280406/.
181. Although Bentham used different language than contemporary utility planners
and regulators, there are parallels between the elements of the seven-step “felicific calculus” that Bentham proposed as a means to evaluate alterative courses of action and the
multi-variable analytic process to produce a robust assessment of long-term cost impacts of
electricity sector investments and potential externalities created by those investments. For
an overview of Bentham’s seven-step “felicific calculus” and John Stuart Mill’s critique of
the analysis, see supra note 171.
182. See Pierce, supra note 26, at 497-99.
183. Id. at 500-04.
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new public health information emerges. 184 Additionally, new information will almost certainly emerge regarding electricity demand,
public health impacts, and fuel prices. Duration does not counsel
solely for projects with short lifespans. There may be value in knowing that an asset, once placed in service, would operate for long periods of time with relatively stable prices. For example, although nuclear power plants are quite expensive to build, they are relatively
inexpensive to operate assuming no significant repair costs are
necessary.185
As described above in Section III.B, significant uncertainty exists
regarding the future of natural gas prices, future electricity demand,
future technology costs, and future regulatory requirements. Unanticipated changes in one or more of these factors could result in dramatic rate increases, stranded assets (if operating a power plant becomes uneconomic before its capital costs are fully paid off), or both.
The degrees of uncertainty may exist along a spectrum. For example,
the policymaker applying this criterion may distinguish between
near-term uncertainty in the potential for price volatility in natural
gas markets, where limited supply results in temporary price spikes,
and the potential for wide variation in long-term price trajectories.
Regulatory uncertainty may also exist along a spectrum. Using mercury regulation as an example, electric utilities have known that limitations on mercury emissions were likely at some point during the
lifetime of coal-fired power plants. Section 112 of the 1970 Clean Air
Act required the EPA to regulate mercury emissions.186 Frustrated
with inaction, Congress overhauled the hazardous air pollution requirements in the 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments, resulting in a
more prescriptive and stringent mandate.187 Rather than require immediate regulation of mercury emissions from electric utilities, the
revised section 112 included a compromise that required the EPA to
undertake a study of the hazards to public health resulting from
emissions at coal-fired electric generating units and regulate those
emissions if the EPA Administrator determines that such regulation
is “appropriate and necessary.”188 The EPA made such a finding in
184. See Jonas J. Monast & Sarah K. Adair, A Triple Bottom Line for Electric Utility
Regulation: Aligning State-Level Energy, Environmental, and Consumer Protection Goals,
38 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 1, 7-8 (2013).
185. See Levelized Cost, supra note 154; see, e.g., Crystal River Nuclear Plant, DUKE
ENERGY, https://www.duke-energy.com/power-plants/nuclear/crystal-river.asp (last visited
Feb. 27, 2016) (reporting Duke Energy’s decision to retire the Crystal River nuclear plant
in Florida due to significant repair costs).
186. Clean Air Act Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-604, § 112, 84 Stat. 1676, 1685.
187. Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, Pub. L. 101-549, tit. I, 104 Stat. 2399 (codified
at 42 U.S.C. § 7412 (2012)).
188. 42 U.S.C. § 7412 (n)(1)(A).
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2000.189 This action put in motion a regulatory process that resulted
in an overturned EPA proposal in 2008.190 A follow-up rule was finalized in 2011.191 Section 112 of the Clean Air Act requires compliance
within three years after the EPA promulgates a final rule, with the
possibility of a one-year extension for individual electric generating
units.192 Although the precise regulatory requirement was unknown
until the promulgation of the final Utility MATS rule, there was increasing certainty that coal-fired power plants would face limits on
mercury emissions.
In the electricity sector context, assessing the timeline for the decision is critical. Is electricity demand expected to grow significantly
in the near-term? Does the near-term need preclude certain generation options with long permitting and construction timelines?193 Are
there strategies for delaying the decision, such as investments in energy efficiency, demand response, increased utilization of existing
plants, or through power purchase agreements? As the Duke Energy
Cliffside example demonstrates,194 investments to meet a projected
near-term need for additional capacity may constrain the options
available to a PUC if future circumstances suggest an alternative
approach could better serve electricity demand and mitigate costs.
Assessing both the potential for the investment to contribute to low
rates and reliable power as well as the potential for economic or regulatory developments to cause higher rates or reliability concerns may
support a higher-cost investment if it is likely to produce desirable
outcomes in a range of future scenarios.195

189. Regulatory Finding on the Emissions of Hazardous Air Pollutants from Electric
Utility Steam Generating Units, 65 Fed. Reg. 79,825 (Dec. 20, 2000).
190. New Jersey v. EPA, 517 F.3d 574, 578 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (vacating the Clean Air
Mercury Rule).
191. Utility MATS, supra note 116.
192. 42 U.S.C. § 7412(i)(3)(B). Implementation timelines are uncertain in the aftermath of the U.S. Supreme Court’s 2015 holding that the EPA must consider costs when
determining whether regulation under section 112 is “appropriate and necessary.” See
Michigan v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. 2699, 2716 (2015).
193. See, e.g., Natural Gas Technology, AM. ELECTRIC POWER, http://www.aep.com/
about/IssuesAndPositions/Generation/Technologies/NaturalGas.aspx (last visited Feb. 27,
2016) (“Natural gas generating plants are constructed much more quickly than coal fired
generation. Simple cycle plants are typically constructed in 18 to 30 months and combined
cycle plants are constructed in about 36 months. These lead times are significantly less
than the average for solid fuel plants (i.e. coal plants), about 72 months.”).
194. See discussion supra Section III.A.2.
195. See generally Bean & Hoppock, supra note 64 (discussing how the decision-making
timeline is affected by uncertainty).
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B. Maximizing Utility by Seeking Multi-Benefit Strategies
Despite the limitations of economic assessments regarding longterm electricity system costs, it is nonetheless possible to identify
categories of risks, such as increasing stringency of environmental
policy or the potential for reduced demand, to result in stranded assets. As demonstrated in Part III, the least cost mandate is more
malleable than is often appreciated by PUCs and could allow commissions to evaluate the range of possible actions against the risks
facing the sector to identify strategies that minimize the risk. In addition to evaluating a broad range of options in an effort to minimize
potential regrets if circumstances change, PUCs could include an additional layer of analysis to consider strategies that offer additional
benefits in addition to affordable rates.
For example, the EPA’s current efforts to limit CO2 emissions
from existing sources under section 111(d) of the Clean Air Act could
be viewed as yet another challenge affecting near-term electric utility
planning. The broad statutory language in section 111, combined
with the limited application of section 111(d) and the lack of any judicial decisions interpreting the section, has led numerous scholars
and stakeholders to conclude that compliance options could include a
wide range of strategies to reduce emissions from the power sector as
a whole rather than focusing on reductions at each individual covered
unit.196 This reading of section 111(d) compliance options, if upheld by
the courts, could allow PUC commissioners and environmental regulators to seek regulatory approaches that achieve additional benefits
for the electricity sector. For example, end-use energy efficiency may
qualify as a compliance option under section 111(d).197 It may also
reduce near-term demand and allow utilities to delay capital investments during a period of uncertainty. Similarly, renewable energy
generation could play a role in section 111(d) compliance while also
increasing diversity in the energy mix as a means to hedge against
natural gas price volatility.
Other multi-benefit strategies may include requirements that utilities act early to limit a range of pollutants in anticipation of more
196. See, e.g., JEREMY M. TARR ET AL., NICHOLAS INST. FOR ENVTL. POLICY SOLS., DUKE
UNIV., REGULATING CARBON DIOXIDE UNDER SECTION 111(D) OF THE CLEAN AIR ACT:
OPTIONS, LIMITS, AND IMPACTS (2013), https://nicholasinstitute.duke.edu/sites/default/
files/publications/ni_r_13-01.pdf; Ann E. Carlson & Megan M. Herzog, Text in Context: The
Fate of Emergent Climate Regulation After UARG and Eme Homer, 39 HARV. ENVTL. L.
REV. 23, 30 (2015); Jody Freeman & David B. Spence, Old Statutes, New Problems, 163 U.
PA. L. REV. 1, 37 (2014); MONAST & HOPPOCK, supra note 142.
197. Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines for Existing Stationary Sources: Electric
Utility Generating Units, 80 Fed. Reg. 64,662, 64,664, 64,666 (Oct. 23, 2015) (codified at 40
CFR pt. 60 (2015)).
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stringent regulations in the future. North Carolina’s Clean Smokestacks Act, adopted in 2002, required utilities to limit SO2 and
NOX emissions before the CAIR/CSAPR rules were promulgated.198
The Clean Smokestacks Act instructed utilities to act early and
provided a longer timeline to achieve compliance thereby allowing
North Carolina’s utilities to adjust retrofit decisions as they learned
more about federal rules. As a result, North Carolina’s utilities were
largely unaffected by the CAIR, CSAPR, and the Utility MATS rules.
These early steps not only avoided rate shocks when the rules were
finalized, but also resulted in significant health benefits for North
Carolina’s citizens.199
While it is generally not within the purview of the PUC to directly
address potential public health impacts, understanding the public
health and environmental impacts of utility’s choices can help PUCs
better assess the risk of increased regulatory stringency. This information could allow PUCs to consider the potential long-term compliance costs associated with various options for meeting, or reducing,
electricity demand. Explicit consideration of environmental impacts,
therefore, may fit within the PUC’s existing statutory mandate.
PUCs may not have the institutional competency to fully assess these
risks. More effective information sharing across state agencies, including coordination between environmental regulators and economic
regulators, could address this hurdle.
C. Maximizing Utility by Dispersing Risk
Once a PUC determines that a utility investment was prudently
incurred, the risk of the investment generally shifts to consumers.200
If electricity demand drops or other generation options become more
cost effective—both situations that have occurred in the aftermath of
the 2008 economic recession—utilities may still recover the full cost
of the original investment. Although PUCs may not reverse decisions
incorporating prudent utility investments into the rate base, utilities
and their investors still face a degree of financial risk with largescale infrastructure investments. The cost of capital may rise, or projects may face cancellation due to cost overruns or technological failures.201 The most notable examples of utility sector investor risk are
found in post hoc efforts to allocate the costs of nuclear units that

198. See sources cited supra note 65.
199. See Andrews, supra note 57; Hoppock et al., supra note 57.
200. See discussion supra Section II.A.
201. Monast & Adair, supra note 141, at 1375-76 (citing Miss. Pub. Serv. Comm’n,
Docket No. 2009-UA-014, Miss. Power Co., at 30, 32, 82 (Apr. 24, 2012)).
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never entered service, thus failing the “used and useful” test.202 PUCs
may also preemptively limit the total costs that ratepayers will face
due to cost overruns, providing a firm signal for utilities to incorporate such costs into the investment risk analysis.203
As previously discussed in Section III.B, technology is changing
rapidly, the price of renewable energy is continuing to fall, natural
gas prices may experience periods of volatility, and the economy may
continue to become more energy efficient.204 Given the level of uncertainty facing electricity providers and regulators, both of whom are
responsible for ensuring that there is a sufficient supply of electricity
to meet demand at all times, it may require a rethinking of what
qualifies as a prudent investment. For example, energy efficiency and
demand response investments may allow utilities to delay new capital investments until they have more information about demand
growth and the stability of natural gas supply. Power purchase
agreements in lieu of capital investments may also allow utilities to
gather more information before acting. There could also be a preference for smaller scale generation or generation with a shorter construction lead-time.
This approach could shift some level of risk back to utilities and
their shareholders, which is a delicate balance and could affect utilities’ ability to attract capital. Shareholders may view this approach
as reducing overall utility because it creates a disincentive for investment by increasing risk and potentially significantly reducing
returns. Ratepayers may also face higher prices if utilities are seen
as a more risky investment and thus charged higher interest rates to
access capital. This should not be seen as an absolute barrier to partial risk shifting. Investors already accept investment risk in other
contexts. While investors may prefer the certainty that comes along
with guaranteed returns on investment, consumers would prefer not
to be solely responsible for long-term investments that may result in
higher electricity rates. Reallocating some business risk could result
in better decisions in the long-term, but it is an important factor to
understand and balance with other goals.
Shifting risk could cut both ways regarding energy innovation.205
This strategy could make it more difficult to pursue early-stage tech202. See, e.g., Jonathan A. Lesser, The Used and Useful Test: Implications for a Restructured Electric Industry, 23 ENERGY L.J. 349, 356-57 (2002); James J. Hoecker, “Used
and Useful”: Autopsy of a Ratemaking Policy, 8 ENERGY L.J. 303, 314 (1987).
203. See Monast & Adair, supra note 141, at 1377.
204. See supra Section III.B.
205. Monast & Adair, supra note 141, at 1375-76.
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nologies such as coal-fired generation with carbon capture technologies due to the high capital costs, long planning and construction
horizon, and considerable uncertainty regarding future electricity
demand and technology costs for other generation options. On the
other hand, shifting a degree of risk away from ratepayers does not
necessarily place the risk on shareholders. Public policy choices to
support innovative energy technologies through tax credits, federal
loan guarantees, and technology grants may allow early stage technologies to enter the marketplace without requiring ratepayers to
bear the cost and technology risk.
V. CONCLUSION
PUC decisions will play a critical role in determining how the electricity sector evolves over the next few decades, including the rates
consumers will pay and the societal impacts that will result. The
least cost framework provides commissioners a significant amount of
discretion to consider the full suite of potential actions and their impacts, even if their state legislatures do not explicitly instruct them
to value non-cost objectives. Failure to consider the wide range of potential impacts could result in higher costs over the operating life of a
facility, and failure to evaluate potential costs and benefits resulting
from an electric utility decision could frustrate the underlying goal of
PUC processes: providing the greatest good to the greatest number
by ensuring a long-term, affordable, and reliable electricity sector.
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